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1.?Introduction
I am publishing in this Journal, a series of papers on Japanʼs experiences as a borrower from the 
World Bank (WB) between 1951 and 1966, by reviewing reports published by the WB and the docu-
ments available at the IMF and the WB Archives. The purpose of the study is to record Japanʼs experi-
ences as a borrower from the WB, and to qualitatively evaluate the relationship between Japan and the 
WB.
The entire series is periodically organized in the following order:
a. Overview
b.  1951‒1953, From Applying for Membership and Joining the WB to Receiving the First Loan
c.  1954‒1957, Receiving Small Loans for Financing Foreign Exchange Expenditures
d.   1958‒1961, From Receiving Loans for Financing Foreign Exchange and Local Cost Expenditures to 
Becoming Ineligible for Bank Financing
e.  1963‒1965, Restarting the Receipt of Loans
f.  1966, Graduating from Bank Borrowing
g.  Concluding Remarks
The first paper was published in October 2011 in this Journal.1 It addressed the initial two themes 
mentioned above: an overview of Japanʼs borrowing from the WB and Japanʼs initial association with 
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the WB between 1951 and 1953. This paper, the second installment in the series deals with the third 
theme mentioned above, analyzing how Japan received small loans for financing foreign exchange ex-
penditures during the period 1954‒1957. The paper also covers the juncture when the WB dramatical-
ly changed its lending policy to Japan in 1957. That was when the WB not only decided to finance the 
foreign exchange expenditure component of its loans to Japan, but also local cost expenditures. This it 
did, after observing the rapid economic growth that Japan achieved especially between 1955 and 1957.
This article consists of three parts: (1) the reshaping of the WBʼs view on the Japanese economy, 
based on the impressive growth achieved during 1952 to 1957; (2) Japanʼ borrowing from the WB; 
and, (3) changes in WBʼs lending policy to Japan. Naturally these three subjects are not independent of 
themselves, and in fact they are closely interlinked. But for the purpose of ease of presentation, this 
work is divided into three parts. Annex 1 provides a summary of the all WB loans during the period 
under consideration, and Annex 2 is the summary of the WBʼs first supervision mission on the power 
companies, the beneficiaries of the first loans approved in October 1953.
2.?The WB?s View on the Japanese Economy
The WB closely reviewed Japanʼs reconstruction and development eﬀorts through periodically visit-
ing Japan and discussing economic issues with the Government oﬃcials and prominent business lead-
ers. The WBʼs review of a countryʼs economy is one of the most important tasks it carries out, in order 
to assess the countryʼs economic and financial policy to further develop, and the amount of external 
debt a country can aﬀord. The views on the economy are the basis for determining the WBʼs lending 
strategy and the amount that can loaned to the country. Table 1 and Table 2 provide data on the Japa-
nese economy for the years 1952‒1956.
The first table below shows the rate at which the economy was adjusting/expanding year by year 
since 1952 and the second, the balance-of-payments. They clearly show the extraordinary turn of eco-
nomic events: industrial production increased by 73％ during the period, 1952‒1956; national income, 
34％; gross domestic capital formation, 62％; exportsʼ value and volume, 97％ and 125％, respectively; 
and, importsʼ value and volume, 57％ and 88％, respectively. The price indices, wholesale and consum-
er prices, in Table 1 show rather stable yearly movements, though no doubt there were much more cy-
clical oscillations if one observes monthly or quarterly data.
The balance-of payments statistics, in Table 2, for the same period shows the declining trend of defi-
cits in merchandise balance, the increasing trend of deficits in other services mainly consisting of 
freight cost and insurance, and the declining trend in US military special procurements. The speed 
with which Japan achieved economic improvements was faster than the WB had expected, and this 
was reflected in the dramatic change in the tone of performance reviews. It is interesting to see these 
changes in a step-by-step manner, by reviewing each of the WBʼs Economic Reports and to observe 
the rapid increase in exports that was largely underestimated. Surprisingly, on the other hand there 
was neither a complementary increase in imports nor a large decrease in US military special procure-
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ments in Japan, which was one of the most important foreign exchange earners.
All though all the Economic Reports are available on the external home page of the WB, the Ar-
chives does not contain any documents relating to the discussions on the terms of reference of each 
Table?1.?Economic Indicators for Japan 1953?1956
Percentage Changes over Preceding Year Percentage Change
1953 1954 1955 1956 1952‒56
Production
Industrial Production 22.7 7.6 8.3 21.2 73.3
Real National Income 4.6 3.3 10.7 12.0 33.9
Per capita 3.0 2.4 9.1 10.9 27.5
Investment
Gross Domestic Capital Formation 18.5 －11.9 24.7 25.8 62.2
Building Construction Starts (value) 28.2 9.2 －7.6 30.8 81.6
Funds Raised for Industrial Equipment— 57.8 －16.8 －30.5 125.2 105.7
Trade
Exports - Values 0.1 27.8 23.4 24.4 96.5
　　　  - Volume 8.2 33.3 30.6 19.0 125.1
Imports - Values 18.3 －0.4 3.4 30.7 57.2
　　　   - Volume 35.9 3.6 5.1 26.8 88.3
Foreign Exchange
　　　   - Reserves (Net) －20.0 0.9 36.3 4.6 14.6
Money Supply & Prices
Cash & Deposit Currency 13.9 3.5 2.6 14.7 38.7
Wholesale Prices 0.4 －0.7 －1.8 4.6 2.4
Consumer Prices 7.5 5.4 －1.4 1.0 12.8
Source:　The Development and Prospects of Japanʼs Economy, July 25, 1957, the World Bank, Page 1.
Table 2.?Summary of International Transactions, 1952?56 (in millions of US dollars)
1952 1953 1954 1955 1956
A. Goods and Services
Exports f.o.b.  1,289  1,258  1,611  2,006  2,458
Imports f.o.b.  1,701  2,050  2,040  2,061  2,602
Merchandise Balance  －413  －792  －429  －54  －144
Other Services  －151  －216  －223  －202  －380
Subtotal  －564 －1,008  －752  －256  －524
US Military Expenditure  788  803  602  505  493
War Reparations  — —  —  －24  －18
Total Goods and Services  225  －205  －51  226  －48
B. Capital Transactions  －10  35  27  128  19
C. Errors and Omissions  1  2  13  －15  21
D. Changes in Foreign Reserves  ＋215  －168  ＋113  ＋339  ＋176
Source:　The Development and Prospects of Japanʼs Economy, July 25, 1957, the World Bank. Page 8.
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economic/sector mission, the basis for selecting economists for economic mission assignments, the 
process of finalizing the draft of the report within the WB and record of discussions between Japan 
and the WB. Due to the lack of information pertaining to the WBʼs policy analysis and its relationship 
with the borrower, it is impossible to assess the quality of the Reports. It therefore becomes diﬃcult to 
judge the degree of understanding that the WB had on Japanese economic issues, and to know how in-
fluential these reports were on the policy changes that were implemented by the Japanese Government.
However, publically available reports have been adequate in assessing the WBʼs understanding of the 
Japanese economy. The relevant reports are the: Economic Chapters of “Japan Report of 1953 Mission” 
dated May 1954; “Recent Economic and Financial Developments in Japan” dated October 14, 1955; 
and “The Development and Prospects of Japanʼs Economy” dated July 25, 1957.2 Before these reports 
can be analyzed, it is appropriate here to restate the conclusions of the first economic report published 
in June 1953.3 The main conclusions of the first report was that in the ensuing five years, Japan could 
make significant progress towards balancing her international accounts on a self-sustaining basis. 
However, it was estimated that a residual deficit of $300 to $400 would still likely remain in 1957. This 
deficit was to be met from the special US dollar disbursements or from some other similar source.
According to Japanese Government projections, this progress was plausible as well, considering its 
estimate that growth in exports would be 45％ higher in 1957 than in 1951. But the Japanese govern-
mentʼs estimates also suggested that there would be an increase in necessary imports resulting from 
population growth, but this would need to be restricted to about 20％. The WB at that juncture 
thought that these projections were too optimistic, moreover they were considered to be favoring ex-
pansion of exports and limiting import increases. In conclusion, the report anticipated that:
If allowance is made for repayment of the US debt, some reparation payments and overesti-
mates of exports, it is likely that the 1957 deficit will be about US$400 million. It is possible to 
reduce this amount if favorable development in raw material and foodstuﬀ resources in the 
South-Asian countries and in world political conditions permitting trade with the mainland 
China. It also emphasized the importance of the continued availability of some sort of special 
procurement by US to balance payments deficit. (vide Ibid., pp. i‒iv and p. 71)
The next review of the Japanese economy was done in November‒December 1953, six months after 
the publication of the first report. The missionʼs purposes were to survey economic developments, to 
update the information obtained during the first economic mission of 1952 and to discuss with the 
Government its economic problems and policies. In addition, the mission had another purpose, to re-
2 Chapters 4 and 5 of Japan: Report of 1953 Mission, May 1954, the World Bank; Recent Economic and Financial Development, 
October 14, 1955, and The Development and Prospects of Japanʼs Economy, July 25, 1957, the World Bank.
3 Japan: Economic Report-Economic Situation and Prospects, June 30, 1953, the World Bank.
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view certain important industries with a view of appraising their modernization programs and look 
into their investment needs. The missionʼs activities to do with the industrial development will be dis-
cussed in depth in the next section of this paper, Japanʼs Borrowing.
The economist assigned to review the macroeconomic situation was also a member of the first eco-
nomic mission to Japan. This report was in due course published in May 1954. It is interesting to note 
that this report had a chapter on the political situation in Japan. The report described how Prime Min-
ister Yoshida negotiated towards the restoration of political stability through the return of Mr. Hatoya-
maʼs Liberals in his party and an informal agreement with Mr. Shigematsuʼs Progressive Party. The 
chapter also mentions two sensational political scandals, the bankruptcy of a mutual finance company 
and the misallocation of government shipbuilding subsidies (vide Ibid., pp. 7‒8). This report was the 
only report that discussed the Japanese political situation so concretely.
On the macroeconomic front, the report concluded that exports had not increased but imports had 
increased considerably. A large amount of US military procurements had financed most of the current 
account deficit and the remaining deficit was financed by foreign exchange reserves. The second report 
clearly suggested that not much had changed to the Japanese economy during 1953, since the first eco-
nomic report. According to the report, the main features of the economy in 1953 were: a very high lev-
el of industrial production, increasing consumption and national income resulting in a higher rate of 
inflation due to the increases in government expenditures, wage increases and a considerable increase 
in commercial bank credit. The eﬀect of inflation was a severe deterioration of Japanʼs balance-of-pay-
ments position, and there was also an increase in imports. Food imports had risen due to poor weather 
and this was coupled with declines in exports to the sterling area, in spite of increases in dollar exports. 
According to the report, “[. . .] A measure of disinflation is urgently needed to bring her economy into 
better balance. Restrictions of Government expenditures to control domestic and imports demand and 
bank credit to control industrial activities would be essential.” On Government policy, it stated that:
The Government appears to be adhering to its declared intention to reduce 1954 government 
expenditures. It insisted, even at a cost of a cabinet crisis and the resignation of three Minis-
ters on a budget for 1954. [. . .] Categorical public declarations that bank credit would be re-
duced gradually have been repeatedly made during the last three months by the Minister of 
Finance and the Governor of the Bank of Japan. (vide Ibid., pp. 2‒3)
The mission was not too optimistic about the redirection of public investment to priority projects but 
found general agreement in establishing conditions favorable to increase exports and to actively pro-
mote an export campaign.
The next formal review of the Japanese economy was done in the middle of 1955, when the WB ana-
lyzed the Japanese economy through 1953, 1954 and the first half of 1955. The report, entitled “Recent 
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Economic and Financial Developments in Japan”, was published in October 1955.4 This report, for the 
first time had a positive tone compared to that of previous reports. The 1955 mission was impressed 
with Japanʼs ability to manage fundamental economic problems arising out of limited resources, im-
plying the need for more imported raw materials and fuels, increasing population, and the need to im-
port more food. But it maintained the original position on the outlook of the balance-of-payments that 
was established in 1953. In the economic section of the ʻReport and Recommendations of the Presi-
dent to the Executive Directorsʼ dated October 17, 1955, it was stated that:
[. . .] It seems fair to note . . . that, during the period under review, Japan has displayed an en-
couraging degree of ability to recognize and deal with certain of her basic economic problems 
even in the face of considerable political pressure and to take advantage of the opportunities 
which have been presented to earn her own living.5
According to the economic report, the strong expansion of demand and output continued in 1953 
resulting in a substantial deterioration of the balance of payments, attributable to a sharp increase in 
imports. Increased imports were due mainly to the expansion of the economy and secondarily to a 
policy adopted by the Government to liberalize imports of raw materials, iron ore, coal and machiner-
ies. On the other hand, exports did not increase. Consequently, in 1953, Japanʼs overall deficit was bal-
anced by the US special procurements that amounted to US$800 million, the highest amount in this 
category of dollar income. The corrective measures were implemented in various forms during latter 
part of 1953. Restrictions were imposed on imports as well as import financing, and the Bank of Japan 
adopted deflationary programs through a high interest rate policy to restrict commercial banks credit 
expansion.
The objectives of these policy measures were to correct the balance of payments disequilibrium by 
reducing domestic demand and domestic prices, thus reducing imports and making exports more 
competitive. These objectives were successfully achieved in a relatively short period of a yearʼs time. 
The restoration of the balance-of-payments equilibrium was achieved by not increasing imports be-
tween 1953 and the first half of 1955. This was due mainly to lower demand for imports arising from 
reduced activity of the economy and it was also influenced by a decline in import prices. On the other 
hand, exports continued to increase in 1954 and 1955 due to reduced domestic demand and lower ex-
port prices. The report stated that:
[. . .] The conclusion of the previous report that Japan could markedly reduce her trade deficit 
has been more than borne out by developments in 1954 and in the first half of 1955 and the 
4 Japan: Economic Report-Economic Situation and Prospects, June 30, 1953, the World Bank.
5 Report and Recommendations of the President to the Executive Directors on a Proposed Loan to the Japan Development 
Bank for Yawata Steel Project, October 17, 1955. P. 5.
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recent record is encouraging. The comparative shortness of the period during which the 
greatest improvement in Japan's trade balance has been sustained, the unknown extent of 
reparation obligations, the uncertain duration and scale of U.S. special expenditures in Japan 
and the important influence of factors beyond Japanʼs control, however, suggest that it is pru-
dent to suspend judgment at this time as to the extent to which Japan is approaching a 
self-sustaining foreign trade position. The demonstration that has been made of the flexibility 
of the Japanese economy and the responsiveness of Japan's foreign trade to internal credit 
measures does suggest that a somewhat more favorable view than has been justified hereto-
fore might now be taken of Japanʼs prospects for eventual self-support, if favorable trends 
outside Japan continue, and if she continues to obtain adequate interim assistance and benefi-
cial trade arrangements. (Ibid. pp. i‒ii)
Thus the WBʼs view on Japanʼs structural trade deficits in terms of the balance of payments and the de-
gree of reliance on receipts from the US special procurement account became more positive than be-
fore. However the economic improvements over 1954 and the first half of 1955 were not suﬃcient to 
change the WBʼs concern on the prospects of Japanʼs balance-of-payments position, as expounded in 
the first economic report in 1953.
The fourth review was made in April/May 1957 and the report was published in July 1957.6 The Jap-
anese economy by then was continuing to expand without an external balance problem throughout 
1956, due mainly to the expansion of exports. From the end of 1955, private investment and stocks be-
gan to rise and this continued throughout 1956. The industrial production index rose 6％ quarterly on 
average as against 3.5％ in 1955. Consequently, imports and related bills began to rise from the third 
quarter of 1956; the Suez Canal crisis in July 1956 contributed greatly to this trend as an extra factor. 
As export continued to increase almost oﬀsetting the increase in imports and related bills, the current 
account surplus started declining in the third quarter of 1956. While the increase in imports and their 
related bills continued in 1957, the increase in exports began to slow down. By the end of the first 
quarter in 1957, the loss of foreign exchange reserves amounted to about US$200 million. The WBʼs 
economic mission then had two jobs: (1) to analyze how Japan was faring in terms of economic devel-
opment and (2) to evaluate what the Government was going to do to manage the overheated economy.
On economic development, the report stated that:
During the last four years, 1953‒1956, the Japanese economy has made much more progress 
than was originally expected. Following the last postwar bout with inflation in 1953, the 
economy went through a disinflationary period of readjustment in 1954 and thereafter devel-
oped at an extraordinary pace. The rate of growth during these last two years is probably 
6 The Development and Prospects of Japanʼs Economy, July 25, 1957, the World Bank.
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unique in the world. From 1952 to 1956, industrial production went up by almost 75％, na-
tional income by around 30％, export trade by nearly 100％ and foreign exchange reserves by 
about 15％ (as observed on Tables 1 and 2). Despite the increase in population and the loss of 
the countryʼs overseas possessions, the Japanese people are enjoying today a standard of life 
substantially better than in normal prewar years.7
[. . .] There now seems reason to hope that Japan can and will develop a self-supporting 
economy on a gradually rising standard of living despite the pressure of population on avail-
able resources. Gross national product and foreign trade have grown at a very rapid rate and 
at the same time the economy has become considerably more diversified. This progress must 
be attributed primarily to the capacity of the Japanese people—their ability to absorb and ap-
ply the advanced production techniques of the West; their willingness to work hard and their 
capacity to save. Other factors have also played a role: the sustained economic growth in the 
rest of the world, which has facilitated the marketing of Japanese products; and the willing-
ness of the United States to assume most of the burden for Japanʼs defense, which has not 
only relieved the drain on Japanese resources but has continued to yield the currency a sub-
stantial although declining dollar income in the form of U.S. disbursements in Japan.8
The report recognized the excellent performance of the Japanese economy during the period and con-
cluded that with stronger manufacturing capacity than before, Japan could continue to increase its na-
tional income at 4‒5％ a year over the next five years, without a major balance-of-payments problems. 
While acknowledging the fact that the speed at with which Japanese economy grew was rather unusu-
al, the WB by far underestimated the positive eﬀects of economic growth on the improvements in the 
balance of payments. It should be also noted that over these years the USʼs position on Japanʼs role in 
the context of the USʼs defense and diplomatic polices in the Pacific area became clearer. Which meant 
that more definite estimates of US military special procurement were now possible. In this context, al-
though the US military special procurements was treated as one of the most important item for foreign 
exchange earning, it was not considered as part of the industrial sector activity. The WB did not ana-
lyze their potential contribution to Japanese economy in terms of possible reduction in domestic pro-
duction costs and improvement in the quality of motor vehicles and various kinds of garments. In the 
end, it took about four years for Japan to convince the WB that Japan was capable of managing her 
economy on her own, in spite of her limited economic resources.
3.?Japan?s Borrowing
Since 1953 the total amount that the WB could lend to Japan was fixed to US$100 million. After 
subtracting the first lending to the three power companies that amounted to about US$40 million (in 
7　  Ibid., p. 1.
8　  Ibid., p. ii.
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1953), the remaining US$60 million was the amount Japan could borrow. However, Japanʼs actual bor-
rowing during the period under consideration eventually only amounted to US$44.7 million. If this 
amount was annually broken down, it accounted to US$5.3 million in 1955, US$32.4 million in 1956, 
and US$7 million in 1957. In actual borrowing, it consisted of five loans: three loans (one in 1955 and 
two in 1956) to the Japan Development Bank (JDB) which were relent to private companies in the in-
dustrial sector; and two loans (one in 1956 and one in 1957) to the public corporations in the agricul-
tural sector. Except one loan to Kawasaki Steel amounting to US$20 million through the JDB, all the 
other loans were very small, not exceeding US$8 million each. In relative terms the total amount of 
borrowing, US$44.7 million was only equivalent to about 2％ of the total annual import of Japan 
during 1954‒1957. The details of the five loans can be found below:
Loans to the Industrial Sector
Loan 1 US$5.3 million loan to the JDB to finance the foreign exchange cost of replacement by Yawata Steel 
of three obsolete plate mills by a single modern four high plate mill approved by the WB Board on 
October 25, 1955
Loan 2 US$8.1 million loan to JDB to finance the foreign exchange cost of four modernization projects to be 
executed by Nippon Steel tube, Toyota Motor, Ishikawajima Heavy Industries and Mitsubishi Ship-
building and Engineering approved on January 31, 1956
Loan 3 US$20 million loan to JDB to finance foreign exchange cost of imported equipment for a semi-con-
tinuous hot and cold strip mill and of related facilities of Kawasaki Steel at its Chiba plan near Tokyo 
approved on December 14, 1956
Loans to the Agricultural Sector
Loan 4 US$$4.3 million loan to the Agricultural Land Development Machinery Public Corporation to fi-
nance foreign exchange cost of projects for land reclamation in Northern Japan and for import of 
cattle approved on December 14, 1956
Loan 5 US$7 million loan to the Aichi Irrigation Public Corporation to finance foreign exchange cost of a 
multi-purpose program in the Aichi area for irrigation, water supply and power generation approved 
on August 8, 1957.
Though the WBʼs initial loan to the three power companies in October 1953 were provided under 
unusual circumstances, without any project preparation/appraisal missions sent to Japan, this was not 
the case for the other loans mentioned above. As it usually does to prepare projects, the WB sent sector 
review missions to Japan in November/December 1953 to assess industry and in July/September 1954 
to assess the agricultural sector. This was carried out with a view to identifying policy issues for im-
provement and specific projects that would be viable for WB financing. Unlike the first loans provided 
to the power companies it was going to become more cumbersome and time-consuming for the WB, 
as it would have to follow standard procedures and processes in preparing projects/loans.
As for Japan, the extensive time required to finalize loan packages was not acceptable. Given the per-
sisting large deficits in the trade account in her balance of payments, what the country needed was ex-
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tra foreign exchange resources. As the private industrial enterprises were hungry for these resources, 
as they were making eﬀorts to rehabilitate and obtain modern technologies from industrial countries 
to expand their manufacturing capacity to produce for domestic and international markets. On the top 
of this, the lending strategy of the WB established in 1953, i.e., the lending amount to finance only part 
of the projects that cover their foreign exchange costs, was kept as intended until 1957. The WB did 
not even try to find ways to improve the speed of disbursement of needed foreign exchange, even after 
observing good economic performance in 1955. If program loans were not an option, some other 
means were required in order to disburse needed funds, for example, through a development finance 
corporation that is capable of checking the feasibility of proposals from enterprises and their financ-
ing.9
Whether Japan understood the value of the whole process of project identification, preparation, ap-
praisal and loan negotiations, is not clear. But for certain, some did but most did not. In general, the 
Government and the final beneficiaries of loans did appreciate WBʼs involvement in technical matters, 
but did not in the management and organization of projects, its commercial/business and financial as-
pects. The Japanese side did not appreciate the WB taking long gestation periods, from identifying 
possible projects to preparing specific loans for WB financing. Further, it took too long to complete 
negotiations between Japan and the WB to receive a small amount of financing, compared to the total 
size of borrowing by companies and Government agencies required.
Another annoyance was the requirement of the Japanese Government, JDB and final beneficiaries to 
put security arrangements in a way foreign to Japan, requiring: Japanese beneficiaries to agree with 
specific financial ratios and future investment programs; and Japanese Governmentʼs agreement to fi-
nance more than one fiscal year of public corporationsʼ multi-year investment program. Some staﬀ of 
the Ministry of Finance even suggested getting foreign exchange resources from the U.S. Export- Im-
port Bank as a better source, than the WB.10 There was an obvious mismatch between Japanʼs needs 
and the WBʼs lending during the period under review. In this section, by reviewing the experiences of 
Japan in receiving the five loans, through the complete process of project identification‒preparation‒
appraisal and loan negotiations, the very same issue of the mismatch will be revealed.
As for the source of information, the standard documents on these five projects/loans are either 
available on the external home page of the WB or in the WB Archives: respective Transcript of the 
9  There were two WBʼs lending experiences to development finance corporations, one in 1949 and one, in 1950. Vide Report 
and Recommendations to the Executive Directors on the Loan Application of the Bank of Finland, July 22, 1949, the World 
Bank and Report and Recommendations to the Executive Directors on the Industrial Development Bank of Turkey Loan Ap-
plication, October 11, 1950, the World Bank.
10 A statement made by Japanese Embassy staﬀ early 1956 quoted in the letter from Rucinski in Washington to Russel in Tokyo 
indicates clearly the preference of the US Export-Import Bank over the WB shown by the power companies for imports of 
thermal power generators. According to the letter, “[. . .] a Japanese Embassy staﬀ said that the Chubu and the Kansai power 
companies preferred to borrow from the Export-Import Bank because their requests were dealt with much expeditiously than 
in the WB and that their experience with the WB in 1953 was disappointing. [. . .]”. vide Letter, Joseph Rucinski to Russel H. 
Dorr, March 7, 1956, Japan-General Folder # 1857455, WB Archives.
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Board Meeting,11 Report and Recommendations of the President to the Executive Directors and Ap-
praisal Report in the external home page of the WB and Project Files consisting of documents, memo-
randums, and reports in the WB Archives. The contents of all Project Files mainly originate from the 
country desk units and only few documents from technical units are included in the Files. While there 
is this bias in filing in the Archives, there is an abundance of available documents associated with the 
processing of the Loans. But the ones related to WBʼs technical staﬀʼ association with government oﬃ-
cials, technical staﬀ of beneficiaries such as steel and power companies are unfortunately missing. It is 
recommended that this paper be read with this limitation in mind.
After the publication of the first economic report on Japan in June 1953 and the approval of the first 
three loans to Japan in October 1953, the WB sent a mission to Japan in November/December 1953 in 
order to: (1) survey economic development with particular emphasis on production, investment and 
consumption; (2) discuss Japanʼs policy to determine investment priorities, to strengthen the economy, 
to find the resources necessary for essential investment, and to stimulate priority private investment; 
(3) examine problems of those industries which influence production costs of export industries; (4) 
explore with the Government and industries the possibility of finding additional sources of raw mate-
rials and foodstuﬀs; and, (5) expedite the eﬀectiveness of the three thermal power loans.12 The WB 
mission consisting of the Japan desk oﬃcer, a macroeconomist, a lawyer and an industrial engineering 
consultant stayed in Japan from November 12 to December 18, 1953. Unlike the first economic mis-
sion, this time the missionʼs duties specifically included the identification of projects suitable for possi-
ble WB financing as can be seen above mentioned in items (2), (3), and (4). And thus an industrial en-
gineering consultant was included as a mission member. The report was published on May 31, 1954.13
Regarding investment needs, the report recommended14 that the agriculture sector be given higher 
priority in order to increase agricultural production, which is required to achieve a self-sustaining 
economy: “Despite the high eﬃciency of the sector, there is reason to believe that more could be done 
to increase agricultural production, particularly in the domains of land reclamation, irrigation, animal 
husbandry and better cultivation practices.”
On industry, the mission singled out the steel sector as the most important for direct export and as 
the supplier of basic raw materials to export industries. While this plan was consistent with the steel 
industryʼs modernization eﬀorts, the WB was in the position that there was a need for further mod-
ernization to maintain competitiveness, in moving beyond open hearth and rolling mill equipment.
On coal, recognizing the high production costs and considerable scope for modernization of equip-
11 Transcripts of the Board Meetings are disclosable documents. They are being disclosed and so far all relevant transcripts relat-
ed this paper, except one concerning Mechanical Land Reclamation Project, have been disclosed. They are available in the ex-
ternal home page of the WB.
12 Memorandum, Joseph Rucinski to Russel H. Dorr, Mission to Japan, Terms of Reference, November 6, 1953, Japan-General 
Folder # 1857454, WB Archives.
13 Japan-1953 Mission Report, May 31, 1954, the World Bank.
14 Ibid., pp. 3‒5.
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ment and techniques, the report was unsure whether Japan should concentrate on increasing produc-
tion in the most easily worked beds or if there was an urgency to reduce coaking coal costs.
On power, in conformity with the WBʼs earlier conclusions concerning the inadequacy of power 
supply capacity, the report questioned Japanʼs policy of giving higher priority to hydro generation over 
thermal generation, given the shortage of capital in the country. In order to expedite the execution of 
major hydroelectric projects, the report suggested the provision to import the required heavy con-
struction equipment.
On machine manufacturing, recognizing the sector as a major foreign exchange earner, it observed 
that light consumer goods and textile machinery were fully competitive, but other items such as rail-
road rolling stock and shipbuilding were only barely holding on. In principle, the sector was believed 
to be in need of better production techniques and facilities.15
As a next step, the report recommended a visit of an agricultural sector mission to lay the founda-
tions for crystallizing Japanese thought as a necessity and means of increasing agricultural and live-
stock output and for securing an adequate allocation of resources to an eﬀective program. It also clear-
ly indicated priority sectors in the industrial sector for possible WB lending, i.e. steel and coal, power, 
and machine industry. In the case of steel and power, the emphasis was given to the modernization of 
the industry including coking coal production. On power, recognizing its importance, the WB pre-
ferred to diversify its investment. However the WB did not want to put too much emphasis on the ma-
chinery industry. It did so by saying that although it recognizes the importance of the machinery in-
dustry and the necessity in modernizing certain portion of its productive facilities, the WB was 
reluctant to become involved in the administrative entanglements of such a program and wanted to 
opt for other desirable projects that could be found.16
After reviewing all of the above-mentioned recommendations made by the mission, the WB man-
agement agreed with them. The WB further instructed that any additional loans be made to the diﬀer-
ent industries, to contribute as widely as possible to strengthening Japanʼs economy. These loans were 
also encouraged to be spread out over the period of time so that there could be a continuing opportu-
nity to re-appraise Japanʼs economic situation. The WBʼs management also instructed its staﬀ to con-
sult with the US Government on its long-range policy and programs for Japan. The WB was keen on 
seeing the US governmentʼs willingness to support its own eﬀorts to encourage Japanʼs pursuit of 
sound financial and development policies spread over the period of time.17
Upon drafting a letter to the Japanese government in accordance with the managementʼs conclu-
sions on the 1953 missionʼs recommendations, the WB formally met with the representatives of the US 
15 Ibid., pp. 3‒5.
16 Ibid., pp. 5‒7.
17 SLC/M/506, Staﬀ Loan Committee, Minutes of Meeting, Thursday, April 8, 1954, Japan-General, Folder #1857455, WB Ar-
chives.
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government as they did in 195318 in order to ascertain the US policy towards Japan, including the ex-
pected military procurement in Japan. They discussed: the positive eﬀect of WBʼs economic policy dis-
cussions; need for the continuation of WBʼs lending to Japan, implying the WB lend the remaining 
US$60 million; and, continuing strong presence of US in the Far East, implying the continuation of 
large amounts of military procurement to be done in Japan. There was one interesting comment from 
the US side, on the positive tenor of the WBʼs draft letter to Japan on the financial policy of Japan:
US commented that while the Japanese Government had made some moves in the direction 
of a sounder financial policy, they (Japanese Government) still had a long way to go, and that 
US felt that WB should be on its guard not to give too much praise in this regard.19
The letter advising Japan on the WBʼs position after the December 1953 mission visit was sent out 
dated April 9, 1954.20 The Japanese Governmentʼs response came, a month later. It was cordial, agree-
ing with the WBʼs point on the need to improve the balance of payments accounts and to establish her 
economy on a self-supporting basis. While agreeing with the lending priority laid out by the WB (i.e. 
development of the domestic food production capability and enhanced competitiveness in the heavy/
chemical industry through the modernization of the iron, steel and other basic industries including 
power), they again requested the possibility of local cost financing and increasing the amount of lend-
ing above and beyond the originally suggested US$60 million.21 Against these requests, the WB simply 
reiterated a month later its position:
[. . .], the Management does not feel that it could recommend loans to Japan at this time be-
yond the direct foreign exchange requirements for approved investment projects. As to the 
extent of foreign indebtedness, which Japan could prudently incur, it was emphasized that in 
arriving at its conclusions the management had viewed Japanʼs problems most sympathetical-
ly.22
The 1953 Mission Report was more comprehensive in terms of identifying projects, and diﬀered 
from that of a typical economic report. The report provided an agricultural and industrial sector wide 
18 The last meeting with the US Government is described in the previous paper, Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies No. 17, 2011, p. 
230.
19 Memorandum from Dorr to Files, “Meeting with United States Government Oﬃcials regarding Bank loans to Japan-April 22, 
1954”, April 23, 1954, Japan-General, Folder #1857455, WB Archives.
20 Letter from President of WB to Minister of Finance of Japan dated April 29, 1954, Japan-General, Folder #1857455 WB Ar-
chives.
21 Letter from Minister of Finance of Japan to President of WB dated May 29, 1954, Japan-General, Folder #1857455, WB Ar-
chives.
22 Letter from Vice President of WB to Minister of Finance of Japan dated June 24, 1954, Japan-General, Folder #1857455, WB 
Archives.
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review, which assisted Japan and the WB in discussing the project specifics for possible WB financing. 
Japan wanted to agree with the WB on the specifics of the projects so that financing would start as ear-
ly as possible, and so her Embassy staﬀ approached the WB actively. At the staﬀ level, the Japanese 
Embassy and WB discussed various projects and as of June 1954, the list of projects included23:
Agriculture Projects
Aichi Irrigation project—the total cost of about US$82 million with US$14 million foreign exchange component
Hachiro Land Reclamation project—the total cost of about US$ 31 million with US$ 0.5 million foreign exchange 
component
Ishikari Peatland project—the total cost of about US$ 119 million with US$ 12 million foreign exchange compo-
nent
Iron and Steel
Five steel companies, Fuji, Sumitomo, Yawata, Nippon Kokan and Kawasaki submitted proposals—the estimated 
total cost of US$ 79 million with foreign exchange component of US$ 39 million
Coal Mines
Four coal mining companies, Mitsubishi, Farukawa, Sumitomo and Ube submitted projects with the total cost of 
US$ 20 million with foreign exchange component of US$ 5 million
Hydro Electric
Japan Power Development Corporation submitted proposals with the total cost of US$ 250 million with foreign ex-
change component of US$ 31 million
Machine Tools
Five electrical equipment companies, four automobile manufacturing companies, three ball bearing companies and 
four machine tool makers submitted proposals with the total cost of US$ 104 million with US$ 38 million foreign 
exchange component
Equipment for two shipbuilding companies projects with the total cost of US$ 4.5 million with US$ 2.6 million for-
eign exchange component.
On the basis of the above description, the Japanese Government requested the WB to finance: 
US$20 million for agriculture, $30 million for steel and coal, $10 million for hydroelectric and $15 
million for machine tool, totaling a sizeable US$ 75 million. The Government was very aware that the 
total was over exceeded the $60 million limit set by the WB, and that all these loans would be spread 
over a period and readjusted among projects, as the details of the projects would be gradually finalized 
in consultation with the technical experts of the WB. The Government then explained that borrowing 
by the steel, coal and machinery industries would be done through the JDB, as the case was with the 
three power loans approved in 1953, in view of the large number of companies involved. For the hy-
droelectric project it was decided that the borrower would be an autonomous public body, the Japan 
Power Development Corporation. As for agricultural projects, the Government planned to establish an 
autonomous public corporation to deal with the implementation of agricultural projects.
While the discussion between the Japanese Embassy staﬀ and the WB in Washington continued, the 
23 Memorandum, N. R. Chakravarti to Files, Japan—Notes of a Meeting with the Japanese Government Representatives on June 
8, 1954, on Future Loans Operations in Japan, dated June 9, 1954, Japan- General, Folder #1857455, WB Archives.
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WB continued sending many missions to Japan through 1954 and 1955. The missions were checking 
the progress made by the three power loans approved in October 1953 and they were exploring ways 
to prepare specific projects in agriculture, power and industrial sectors for WB financing. Information 
available in the Archives indicate that: the power project supervision mission visited Japan in May/
June 1954; the agriculture project identification/preparation mission in July/August 1954; for general 
discussions the desk oﬃcer in July/August 1954; the agriculture sector review mission in September/
October 1954; the project identification/preparation mission for the modernization of steel and ma-
chinery manufacturing sectors in October/November 1954; and the power project identification/ 
preparation mission in October 1954. These visits made throughout the year 1954 allowed the WB to 
accumulate plenty of knowledge on how the Japanese economy was managed.
One of the most influential visits made by the WBʼs staﬀ during that time, in order to turn discus-
sions into specific loans, was the visit of the Japan Desk Oﬃcer in July‒August 1954. He met with the 
Prime Minister, Minister of Finance and Industry and Trade, and the Governor of the Bank of Japan.24 
In addition, he had broad discussions with senior civil servants and business leaders on the Japanese 
economy, investment requirements and the possible role of the WB. On his return to the headquarters, 
he orally reported his findings on the economic developments and the status of the various projects to 
the management of the WB.25 Surprisingly these meeting signaled a rather new role for the WB. This 
meant that although the lending amount was to be further limited, the WB consultations with Japan 
and its technical advice was to be continued in order to impact on Japanʼs economy positively.
On the basis of this general note, the meeting agreed that provisions for formal and informal techni-
cal assistance to Japan would be a basic element of the WB operations. On the proposed projects, sug-
gestions and presentations were made to improve economic/financial analysis of the proposals. It was 
also agreed, that with a view to preparing a project in the coal sector, the WB should give assistance to 
Japan by providing a list of qualified firms to conduct a proposed survey of the coal industry. The 
meeting also pushed the operating Departments to proceed swiftly in its examination of the proposed 
power projects, various steel and heavy industry projects, in order to address Japanʼs grievances that 
the WB was taking too long in processing project proposals. However, the proposed technical assis-
tance was farfetched and the instructions of the WBʼs management to improve the processing time of 
loan preparation were not too assertive.
Given the overall strategy of financing with only foreign exchange costs of the project to be financed, 
the WB could have been more creative in finding ways to let Japan import necessary plants and equip-
24 See a letter from Russell Dorr to Robert L. Gardner, Vice-president of the WB, dated August 7, 1954, sent from Tokyo; and 
Prime Minister Yoshidaʼs note on his conversation with World Bank Staﬀ (Dorr) dated August 17, 1954; Prime Minister visit-
ed the WB to meet the President of the WB and he was updated on the progress of the preparation of various loans. For this 
discussion, see Memorandum, R. H. Dorr to Files, “ Aid Memoire for Prime Minister Yoshida, November 10, 1954”, Ja-
pan-General Folder #1857455, WB Archives. For an additional note, Prime Minister Yoshidaʼs cabinet fell in the beginning of 
December1954.
25 SLC/M/534, Staﬀ Loan Committee, Minutes of Staﬀ Loan Committee Meeting held Thursday, August 24, 1954, Japan-General 
Folder #1857455, WB Archives.
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ment quickly. It was the need of the moment to help satisfy Japanʼs ambition for achieving economic 
growth through export expansion, enhancement of manufacturing capacity with higher eﬃciency, 
leading to import substitution and increased exports. In this sense, the timing of WB lending was im-
portant. Though small, quick decision on specific lending was required, the decision-making on the 
part of the WB regarding lending was too slow and all the events that took place in 1954 and 1955 
were disappointing to Japan.
3.1?Lending to the Industrial Sector
The Japanese Government submitted in August 1954 formal requests, for the WB to finance six steel, 
seven other industrial, four coal mining, and three hydro power projects,26 as a follow up of discus-
sions between Embassy staﬀ and the WB in June 1954. On the basis of the requests, an industrial mis-
sion visited Japan in October/November 1954 to examine the steel companies proposals as shown be-
low in Table 3, and to collect the necessary information on the possibility of a machinery project under 
WB financing. The WBʼs analysis was that the proposals made by Yawata and Japan Steel Tube (rank-
ing first and third respectively in the Japanese steel industry) were suitable for WB financing provided 
that they strengthen their financial position. The Sumitomo seamless tube mill project was economi-
cally sound and the WB did not want be involved in the financing of its small foreign exchange re-
quirement of about US$350,000.
On the Kawasaki Steel project, the WB had doubts regarding its marketing and financial plans due 
to the lack of information, and it wanted revised proposals and more information for its consideration. 
On the Sumitomo pipe mill and the Fuji Steel projects, the WB was not convinced that market require-
ments justify the construction of these facilities at that time. Subsequently these two projects were 
26 Memorandum, A. L. Moffat to Eugene R. Black, Japanese Loan Applications, August 18, 1954, Japan-General Folder 
#1857455, WB Archives.
Table?3.?Loan Proposals for Steel Modernization
Company Equipment Total CostUS$ ʻ000
Foreign Exchange
US$ ʼ000
Yawata Steel High Plate Mill Replacement  13,890  4,378
Fuji Steel Tin Plate Mill—Addition to Capacity 4,128  2,270
Japan Steel Tube Seamless Tube Mill—Replacement
 8,889  3,995
Sumitomo Steel a.　Seamless Tube Mill —Replacement
b.　Butt Weld Pipe Mill—New Capacity
2,222
2,733
337
1,191
Kawasaki Steel Hot and Cold Rolled Strip Mill
　Mainly Replacement  35,275  13,773
Total  67,139  25,953
Source:　SLC/O/767, Memorandum, Staﬀ Loan Committee, Japan-Loan Proposals for Steel Mill Modernization, Department of 
Operations Asia-Middle East, May 11, 1955, Japan-Nippon Steel Project Folder #1857635, WB Archives.
?     ?229
Japan and the World Bank, 1951?1966: Japan as a Borrower (2)
withdrawn.27 The memorandum to the Staﬀ Loan Committee had a special section entitled “Discus-
sion” explaining the importance of this industry in the context of the reconstruction eﬀorts of the 
country. It also contained the history of the steel industry in Japan particularly during the war, through 
nationalization, and after the war, with denationalization, and its poor financial structure. The man-
agement of the WB agreed with the recommendations made by the memorandum and the WB started 
the preparation of the two specific projects, one for Yawata Steel and the other for Japan Steel Tube. 
While the Yawata Steel project became ready for further processing, the Japan Steel Tube project was 
delayed because of changes in the contents of the project including changes in the financial plan of the 
Company.28
Yawata Steel Project
According to the Technical Report on the Yawata Steel project, Yawata was undertaking an extensive 
modernization program since 1951. This was being carried out with a view to improving iron and steel 
making facilities, by renovation and repair of existing facilities and the addition of new facilities. This 
investment program after completion would have amounted to about US$100 million equivalent. As 
part of the modernization program, a single modern plate-mill was to replace three obsolete plate-
mills with an annual capacity of 360,000 tons, at Yawata in Fukuoka Prefecture, Kyushu. The total cost 
of the new mill was estimated at US$15.6 million with a foreign exchange cost of US$5.3 million. The 
Technical Report explained that the unit production cost of the plate after the installation of the new 
plant would be reduced by US$12 equivalent per ton or about 12％.29
The formal negotiations on the Yawata Steel project started on August 5, 1955 when the representa-
tives of Yawata, JDB and the Japanese Government met with the WB for the first time. The project was 
initially proposed with a loan amount of US$4.4 million but this had to be increased to US$5.3 million 
mentioned above due to increases in price, escalation and contingencies and new items added for fi-
nancing. The discussions were diﬃcult and protracted. The technical discussion on the project itself 
was simple and the Yawata Steel ordered the main plate equipment through the WBʼs agreement even 
before the start of the negotiations.30
On the other hand, the discussions on financial covenants and security arrangements took a long 
time to reach agreement.31 These experiences were similar to those at the time of the first loan to the 
three power companies in 1953. On financial covenants detailed in a letter to Yawata Steel in the Proj-
27 SLC/O/767 Staﬀ Loan Committee, Japan-Loan Proposals for Steel Mill Modernization, Department of Operations Asia-Mid-
dle East, May 11, 1955, Japan-Nippon Steel Project Folder #1857635, WB Archives.
28 Memorandum, S. Lipkowitz to Mr. Hugh B. Ripman, Japanese Projects Status, September 13, 1955, Japan-General Folder 
#1857455, WB Archives.
29 Technical Report on Yawata Steel Project, October 17, 1955, the World Bank. P.6
30 Letter, President of Yawata Iron Steel CO., to President of the WB, Ordering of Heavy Plate Equipment, July 18, 1955, Ja-
pan-Nippon Steel Project Folder #1857635, WB Archives.
31 A complete set of minutes of the meeting, in total 34 meetings, between Japanese delegation and WB is available in Japan-Nip-
pon Steel Project Folder #1857636, WB Archives.
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ect Agreement, the WB was more aggressive than during its stance taken at the time of negotiations 
with the three power companies. This was because Yawata Steel was purely a private entity from the 
WBʼs point of view. The WB was concerned over its debt financing, largely short-term on its face, to 
carry out heavy reconstruction and expansion programs. Given this situation, the WB wanted to see 
definite improvements in the financial position of Yawata Steel.
After long discussions, often diﬃcult, Yawata Steel and the WB agreed that Yawata would reduce the 
margin between total liabilities and current assets after March 31, 1957. Furthermore this margin was 
to be eliminated by March 31, 1965. This margin as of March 31, 1955 was ¥8.8 billion and was esti-
mated at ¥8.3 billion for March 31, 1957. Yawata would also undertake to progressively reduce its total 
liabilities compared to net worth during the same period. The ratio of liabilities to net worth stood at 
144 : 100 on March 31, 1955 and was to be reduced progressively to 115 : 100 by March 31, 1965. 
Though Yawata understood the objectives of these undertakings, it was diﬃcult for it to realize the 
meaningfulness of these conditions. As they were too rigid it made it diﬃcult for a private enterprise 
to manage its own aﬀairs on these margins and the ratios were to be improved year by year in some 
case and in periods of two or three years in other cases. If it was the job of the WB to make this kind of 
conditions, it was only natural for Yawata to think that it was the job of the Government as the guaran-
tor and JDB as the borrower.32
On security, a key issue was how to set up a legal instrument to secure the relationship amongst Ja-
pan, the borrower (JDB), the beneficiary of the loan (Yawata Steel) and the WB. Basically there were 
three agreements: a Loan Agreement between the WB and JDB, a Project Agreement between the WB 
and Yawata Steel, and a Guarantee Agreement between the WB and Japan. The negative pledge issue 
was handled in a similar way to the power loans, in that Yawata was to execute a general Mortgage 
Note evidencing a “general mortgage” priority on its assets as security for the JDB loan and the Gener-
al Mortgage Note was specifically to include a negative pledge covenant in the Loan Agreement. Simi-
lar to the form in the previous power loans, the Guarantor would undertake to make the provisions of 
its negative pledge clause eﬀective with respect to liens on assets of political subdivision and their 
agencies within the limits of its constitutional powers. An undertaking to make the negative pledge 
clause eﬀective with respect to liens on the assets of the Bank of Japan was, however, given separately.33
From the time Japan formally applied for the steel project in August 1954 it took the WBʼs Board 14 
months to prepare the loan. One might ponder why it took so long? As in the end after long extended 
discussions, all concerned agreed and the WBʼs Board approved the Yawata Steel loan on October 25, 
1955. It must have been diﬃcult for Yawata, being a large private steel company to spend 14 months to 
comply with the WB for only a US$5.3 million loan. The project was executed eﬃciently. Using the 
available balance in the loan account, Yawata imported additional items, equipment and bearing. This 
32 Similar sentiments were felt by Japanese representatives at the time of negotiations of the Power Loans in 1953.
33 Memorandum, Memorandum to the Staﬀ Loan Committee, Japan-Proposed Loan for Yawata Steel Project, October 11, 1955, 
Japan-Nippon Steel Project Folder #1857636, WB Archives.
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necessitated the extension of the original closing date of the loan by another year. It is interesting to 
note that Yawata Steel returned to JDB and the WB to receive another loan in 1959.
After all the dust settle down on the Yawata Steel loan negotiations, the preparation started for the 
negotiations on the next loans for the Various Industrial Projects. The two WB lawyers working on 
Japan including the Yawata Steel loan negotiations wrote a warning memorandum to their superiors 
saying that
[. . .] given the cultural diﬀerences between Japan and the Western world,
[. . .] the WB must concede something to these fundamental diﬀerences of outlook and rec-
ognize that contractual relations and forms of expression and conventional financial doc-
trines may not have the same meaning to the Japanese as to us.
[. . .] They will especially respect the Bank if the Bank lends them money and demonstrates 
that it really understands the context in which the lending is being made.
[. . .] The Japanese are anxious to learn financial “know-how”- and increasing commercial 
relations with foreigners makes it increasingly necessary that they should conform to foreign 
methods. However, in some cases, it may be doubtful that we have been teaching them the 
kinds of lessons which they can at the present time understand and regard as useful, or in-
deed which it is desirable that they should learn (vide the Yawata “financial covenants letter”). 
The power loans were good loans because they were large loans made fairly expeditiously for 
projects the Japanese themselves wanted. All loans to Japan should have these characteristics 
if the Japanese are to continue to respect us and we are to influence them. Per contra, small 
loans made with diﬃculty after protracted negotiations, or any loan made within a frame-
work, which we create for them, may be a disservice both to us and to them. The pattern of 
future lending to Japan might well take theses broad considerations into account.34
There is no record of follow-up discussions on this memorandum among the information available in 
the Archives, but there were sings of WBʼs eﬀorts to improve the situation. But from then on, the pro-
cess of negotiations between Japan and the WB were more organized than before, especially on the 
loans for the Various Industrial Projects that will be described below.
Various Industrial Projects
After the industrial mission visited Japan in October 1954, the Japanese Government and the WBʼs 
discussion on floating a machinery project became concrete. Of the seven industrial machinery proj-
ects (Mitsubishi Shipbuilding, Ishikawajima Heavy Industries, Hitachi, Tokyo Shibaura, Nippon Elec-
tric, Toyota Motor and Nissan Motor) submitted to the WB, two companies (Hitachi and Tokyo Shi-
34 Memorandum, V. Morsely and R. B. J. Richards to Messrs. Sommers/Broches, Lending to Japan, January 23, 1956, Japan-Gen-
eral Folder #1857455, WB Archives.
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baura) withdraw their applications and the WB rejected one proposal (Nissan Motor), and thus 
remaining four projects were to form a project called Machinery Projects.35 During the Annual Meet-
ings of September 1955, the Japanese Minister of Finance requested the WB to simplify borrowing 
procedures referring to the complicated Yawata negotiations. The WB suggested an approach under 
which all industrial projects would be lumped together and one loan would be made to an appropriate 
institution, in this case the JDB. Following this approach, the Japan Steel (one of the two remaining 
steel projects) and Machinery Projects were put together as one as Various Industrial Projects, as re-
vealed in Table 4.36
According to the Technical Report on Various Industrial Projects,37 the proposed loan of US$8.1 
million equivalent would be lent to the JDB for relending to four industrial companies: (1) The Japan 
Steel Tube was the third largest steel producer with an output of 500,000 tons of finished steel per year. 
The proposed loan was to install a new 120,000 tons seamless tube mill to replace two old mills in or-
der to produce a wider range of tubes of higher quality and at a lower cost; (2) The Mitsubishi Ship-
building and the Ishikawajima Heavy Industries were primarily producers of ships and marine en-
gines, although they produced other industrial equipment as well. The proposed loan was to retool for 
more eﬃcient production of diesel engines and superchargers in order to produce higher quality prod-
ucts at a lower cost; and, (3) The Toyota Motor Company was making cars, trucks and busses with a 
total annual output of 23,000 units. The proposed loan was to modernize its truck and bus production 
with better quality and reduced costs.
Also the WB responded to the Japanese complaints over its slow speed of processing loans, compli-
cated financial covenants and security arrangements. Several considerations favored combining the 
35 Memorandum, D. W. Jeﬀries to R. H. Dorr, Summary of TOD Report on Japanese Machinery Projects (Draft of August 26, 
1955), October 12, 1955, Japan-Industry Project Folder #1857646, WB Archives.
36 SLC/M/604, Staff Loan Committee, Minutes of Staff Loan Committee Meeting held Wednesday, November 23, 1955, Ja-
pan-Industry Project Folder #1857646, WB Archives.
37 Appraisal Report on Various Industrial Projects, February 14, 1956.
Table?4.?Loan Proposals for Various Industrial Projects
Company Equipment Total Project Cost  (US$ million)
Proposed Loan
(US$ million)
Actual Loan
(US$ million)
Japan Steel Tube Seamless tube mill (replacement) 11.2 2.6 2.6
Mitsubishi  
Shipbuilding
18 machine tools for retooling, marine 
engine and supercharger production
1.7 1.3 1.5
Ishikawajima Heavy 
Industries
Tooling for production of large marine 
turbines
2.5 1.6 1.65
Toyota Motor Medium truck production 9.6 2.9 2.35
Nippon Electric Telephone and telegraphic equipment 
production
5.4 1.6
Total 30.4 10.0 8.1
Source:　SLC/O/810, Memorandum, Staff Loan Committee, Japan-Loan Negotiation Concerning Various Industrial Projects, 
Novermber18, 1955, Japan-Industry Project Folder #1857646, WB Archives. Of the above, Nippon Electric withdrew its 
application after the memorandum was prepared but before the loan negotiations started.
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proposed projects into a single loan. The projects were small in relation to the Japanese economy and 
its requirements for capital. Negotiation and processing of separate loans would have caused delays 
and increased administrative burdens upon all parties. Thus both from an administrative and public 
relations point of view, handling these projects as a package seemed most desirable.38 Another factor 
was that these loans were set up in such a way that there was no direct legal relation between the WB 
and the beneficiary companies i.e. no Project Agreement. It meant that the subsidiary loan agreements 
between the JDB and the beneficiary companies would replace a Project Agreement between the WB 
and the beneficiary companies.
On security arrangement, unlike the previous loans made by the WB to the JDB, no provisions were 
made for the WB to receive from the JDB, the security which the JDB received from the beneficiary 
companies. The WB understood that these security arrangements were in conformity with normal Jap-
anese banking practice. The WB would obtain from the JDB a negative pledge clause in the usual form. 
The Guarantee Agreement was similar to the Yawata case, except that Japan would guarantee payment 
but not performance. The negative pledge clause was also identical to the Yawata loan.
On financial matters, the WB became more flexible than before and there was the “Financial Cove-
nants Letter” for each of the four companies, they were similar in form but diﬀerent in detail. As Japan 
Steel Tubeʼs financial condition was poorer than the others at that time, tougher conditions were 
spelled out in the financial letter (Ibid., Appraisal Report, p. 22). The WBʼs Board approved the loan on 
February 21, 1956.
Since most of the equipment was to be imported, they were already contracted by the time the 
Board approved the Loan. Thus the procurement of equipment financed by the Loan and project im-
plementation went on smoothly, but as expected there were some changes in the list of equipment im-
ported. The loan eventually financed more than 100 machines and machine tools from the US, UK, 
West Germany, France and Italy.39
Kawasaki Steel Project
The Kawasaki Steel was one of the leading Japanese manufacturers of plates and sheets. But its mills 
were obsolete and their costs of production were higher than those of modern continuous or semi- 
continuous strip mills. The original Kawasaki Steel project prepared in 1954 was intended to construct 
a new strip mill with a fully continuous hot and cold strip mill: with a rated annual capacity of 600,00 
tons of hot strip and 400,000 tons of cold strip. In order to utilize the capacity of such a mill, sub-
38 Report and Recommendations of the President to the Executive Directors on a Proposed Loan to the Japan Development 
Bank for Various Industrial Projects January 31, 1956, the World Bank, p. 2
39 It should be noted that the important expanded role of JDB within the framework of the Various Industrial Projects going be-
yond usual borrowerʼs role as in the Power and the Yawata Steel Projects did not go further to make it as a development fi-
nance corporation. The expanded role of the JDB could have been the WB to finance small foreign exchange requirements of 
many private sector enterprises and the JDB becoming a WBʼs partner to evaluate feasibility of private enterprisesʼ proposal 
for financing.
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stantial expansion of existing metallurgical capacity was also planned. The total cost of this expansive 
program was estimated at US$59 million. The WB missionʼs review thereof in the fall of 1954 conclud-
ed that the proposal was too ambitious, considering the marketing required for the products and 
Kawasakiʼs limited financial resources. In December 1955, a more realistic proposal was presented to 
the WB for a semi-continuous mill with an annual capacity of 390,000 tons of hot strip and 300,000 
tons of cold strip at the Chiba plant, with an estimated investment cost of US$42.1 million. The Kawa-
saki Steel requested the WB to finance the foreign exchange cost of the project, totaling US$18.5 mil-
lion.40
Due to the heavy debt incurred in the past few years for the construction of new pig iron and steel 
facilities, the companyʼs financial position had been weak. Kawasaki Steel proposed to strengthen its 
own financial position, but from the WBʼs point of view, it was not far enough.41 In order to keep Ka-
wasaki Steel as one of the key Japanese steel makers, a balance between improving the existing produc-
tive capacity and the improvement in utilization of the existing plant was called for. The substantial 
amount of investment proposed would seek to rectify this situation. After careful analysis of a long list 
of concerns, including the quality of management of the Kawasaki Steel and its principal banker, the 
Daiichi Bank, the WB eventually decided to go ahead with the project and to accept the risk of possi-
ble financial diﬃculties to be faced by the Kawasaki Steel.
In order to have safeguards preventing possible financial diﬃculties, the WB proposed far-reaching 
financial reorganization for Kawasaki Steel. This involved the increase of its equity capital by ¥2 billion, 
most of which was used to reduce medium term debt. New arrangements with the companyʼs long-
term creditors were made, involving the rescheduling of capital repayments and postponing their ma-
turities until and after the completion of construction. Amortization on these loans was made contin-
gent upon its payments to ensure Kawasaki Steelʼs current ratio did not fall below 1.8 to 1. Finally, 
Kawasaki Steelʼs principal banker, the Daiichi Bank, entered into standby arrangement with a 15 years 
line of credit to provide working capital and it also undertook to underwrite refunding issues of mort-
gage debentures if needed.42
The negotiations among the Government, Kawasaki Steel, JDB and the WB were smooth, despite 
needed agreements on many complicated financial covenants. In the end, the basic legal status among 
the Japanese Government, the WB, JDB and the Kawasaki Steel remained similar to when the loans 
were provided to Yawata Steel and Various Industries. One new feature was the financial arrangements 
between the Kawasaki Steel and its various long-term creditors. A set of Agreements with conditions 
40 A Letter from Kosuke Okada, Treasurer, Kawasaki Steel Corporation to International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, dated December 23, 1955, Japan-Kawasaki Steel Project Folder #1857657, WB Archives.
41 Memoranda, S. Lipkowitz to S. Aldewereld, Kawasaki Semi-Continuous Strip Mill Project, December 30, 1955 and Kawasaki 
Construction Plans and Cost Estimates, January 3, 1956, Japan-Kawasaki Steel Project Folder #1857657, WB Archive.
42 SLC/M/624, Staﬀ Loan Committee, Minutes of Staﬀ Loan Committee Meeting held Tuesday, March 20, 1956, Japan-Kawasaki 
Steel Project Folder #1857657, WB Archives, and A Letter from R. L. Garner, Vice President of the World Bank to Kawasaki 
Steel Corporation dated April 26, 1956, Japan-Kawasaki Steel Project Folder #1857657, WB Archives.
?     ?235
Japan and the World Bank, 1951?1966: Japan as a Borrower (2)
for eﬀectiveness was put forth for the loan. The WBʼs Board approved the loan on December 14, 1956. 
The project was implemented quicker than expected and the mills were in operation a year earlier. It is 
interesting to note here that Kawaski Steel had returned to the WB for additional loan, soon after the 
first loan was approved.
The relationship between the WB and Kawasaki Steel was more favorable, as compared to the rela-
tionship it had with Yawata Steel. This was surprising considering that Kawasaki Steel was in a worse 
financial situation when compared to the other steel companies and it had deep marketing concerns 
for its products. Somehow there was a breath of fresh air, with improved communication and profes-
sional understanding between Kawasaki Steel and the WB. This could also possible be attributed to the 
Kawasaki Steelʼs successful strategy in using the WB to expand its steel production capacity and more-
over improve its financial position. The Japanese Government also needed the WBʼs involvement, es-
pecially to obtain an independent evaluation of steel demand, both at the domestic and international 
levels, and a detailed supply analysis.
3.2?Lending to the Agriculture Sector
Agriculture Sector Report43
On the basis of discussions in December 1953 between the Japanese Government and WB mission, 
and another formal request from the Japanese Government, the agriculture mission visited Japan in 
July/September 1954. The purpose of the mission included a general review of Japanese agricultural 
and animal husbandry conditions and practices. The WB sought to familiarize itself with Government 
policies and programs to increase agricultural and livestock production. So it conducted a review on 
the pattern of resource allocation in order to achieve the greatest production increases within the next 
ten years, and to recommend specific projects that would be appropriate for WB financing. The agri-
culture sector report titled “Present Position and Prospects of Agriculture in Japan” was published in 
January 1955. It was immediately made available to the Government, so that the reportʼs suggestions 
could be taken into consideration in the formulation of the 1955 budget.
The report elucidated the inherent drawback the sector faced:
Perhaps the most important single feature of Japanʼs present and prospective economic posi-
tion is that she cannot feed her people without importing large and ever increasing quantities 
of food from abroad. In 1953, she imported 4 million tons of grains and other staple foods 
and had to devote 40％ of the proceeds of her merchandise exports to pay for them.
[. . .] In the absence of eﬀective measures to increase food production above the current  
level, it appears that essential to increase food imports would mount in ten years to around 6 
million tons at a cost, at then current prices, of US$ 750 million a year.
43 Agricultural Sector Report, Present Position and Prospects of Agriculture in Japan, January 3, 1955, the World Bank.
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[. . .] Larger food production thus appears to be an absolutely essential feature of any  
Japanese drive to make her own way and to achieve an independent economic position. 
(Ibid., p. 2)
On the basis of this principal understanding, that somewhat larger allocation of funds was of funda-
mental importance to addressing the food problems in Japan. The report recommended (Ibid., pp. ii‒
iii) that:
1. Increased attention should be given to non-rice projects. Accepting the fact that the diminishing 
returns for increasing the area and yield of rice cultivation, energetic national eﬀort should be ap-
plied to the cultivation of upland crops and to animal husbandry. Without neglecting rice produc-
tion, the use of modern methods and equipment would bring much larger additions to the food 
supply;
2. Land reclamation should be greatly accelerated. In the next 10 years at least 80,000 hectares should 
be reclaimed per annum;
3. More resources should be devoted to increasing livestock numbers. Present pasture and grazing 
lands are not fully exploited, and a sharp increase in livestock through larger imports, at least 
2,500 young cattle per year, will be necessary;
4. Greater eﬀort should be made to increase upland irrigation. Since positive result can be achieved 
with small amounts of irrigated water at low costs, 20,000 hectare should be irrigated per year over 
the next decade;
5. Increased emphasis should be placed on research and extension work relating to upland irrigation, 
developing diﬃcult soils, upland crop cultivation and mixed farming;
6. Increased funds and credits should be provided for settlers;
7. The crop insurance scheme should be modified to reduce the drain on the Government budget, 
and adjustment of the present price subsidy system to producers and consumers should be consid-
ered; and,
8. Current and projected land improvement projects should be carefully re-examined and low return 
undertakings should be postponed in favor of high return ones, and available funds should be 
concentrated upon the rapid completion of projects now underway (vide Ibid., pp. 27‒28).
On Japanese requests for possible WB financing, the mission reviewed the proposals and concluded 
four projects worthy of further study, as they seemed particularly useful in leading to increased food 
production. They were the Aichi Irrigation, Hachiro Lagoon, Shinotsu (Ishikari) Peatland Reclama-
tion, and Mechanical Land Reclamation Pilot Projects. The report specified that the remaining work 
left for WBʼs appraisal included: the possibility of constituting an executing organization for project 
implementation, the completion of engineering studies and the scope for domestic currency financing 
for executing projects. In regards to project financing, assuming all four projects to be implemented, 
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the report estimated the need for additional budget allocations of US$14 million (or ¥5 billion equiva-
lent) per annum, for a period of 7 years. This amount was not considered too large, especially compar-
ing to the total annual budget of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, which was US$ 440 million 
in 1955. For a possible source of financing and additional investment, the report mentioned the avail-
ability of counterpart funds under the provisions of U.S. P. L. 480 (Ibid., p. 35).
On the basis of these recommendations in the report, the WB conducted deliberations with the Jap-
anese Government.44 Over the year 1955 several agricultural specialists visited Japan: an agricultural 
economist to ascertain the reaction of the government to the recommendations made in the Agricul-
ture Report; two agriculture experts to review progress mad in the preparation of the mechanical land 
reclamation projects; and, an animal husbandry specialist, to assist the Government in the preparation 
of a possible cattle import project.
Conversely several Japanese specialists from the Land Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry also visited the WB to discuss the land reclamation projects. Out of four projects (Aichi Irri-
gation, Mechanical Land Reclamation, Livestock Improvement, Hachiro Lake reclamation, and Shi-
notsu Peatland Reclamation), the WB only deemed two, the Livestock Improvement and Mechanical 
Land Reclamation projects were ready for negotiations in 1955. Indeed, this was the case as there were 
still many issues to resolved, including the provision of adequate local currency funds, the completion 
of engineering studies including cost estimates, and the setting up of appropriate organizations for the 
implementation of various projects. During the Annual Meetings in September 1955, the Minister of 
Finance asked the WB which agriculture projects were ready for financing in the near future. The WB 
explained that the Mechanical Land Reclamation and Livestock Improvement projects might be ready 
for negotiations before the end of the year. On the Aichi Irrigation project, the WB indicated the need 
for further time to review the ongoing engineering studies.45
Loan to the Agriculture Land Development Machinery Public Corporation
By the end of 1955, the WB put three projects, the original Mechanical Land Reclamation, Shinotsu 
Peatland Reclamation and the Livestock Improvement project together to form one undertaking, the 
new Mechanical Land Reclamation project.46 The reason why these projects were combined into a sin-
gle project was that each component was small in relation to Japanese agricultural undertakings and 
that if each component were treated as a separate project, administrative burdens would increase. Thus 
the new Mechanical Land Reclamation project involved the introduction into Japan techniques of rap-
44 Among the Files associated with the Agriculture Report and Projects in the Archives, it is unfortunate that no record of the 
formal discussions between the Japanese Government and the WB on the Report. On the basis of available memorandum and 
records of discussion, this paragraph was written up.
45 Memorandum, Joseph Rucinski to Files, “Meeting with the Japanese Delegation on September 14, 1955,” September 22, 1955, 
Japan-General Folder #1857455, WB Archives.
46 SLC/M/609-B, Staﬀ Loan Committee, Minutes of Staﬀ Loan Committee Meeting held Friday, December 23, 1955, Japan-Me-
chanical Land Reclamation Project, December 23, 1955, Japan-Agriculture Project Folder #1857674, WB Archives.
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id, large-scale, low cost land reclamation through pilot operations in three regions. These regions had 
diﬀerent soil and vegetation and were in diﬀerent parts of Japan, Ishikari peat land (Shinotsu), Konsen 
Plain in Eastern Hokkaido (Konsen), and Kamikita area of Aomori in the Northern Main Island (Ka-
mikita). With a view to assisting farmers in developing mixed farming in Konsen Plain and Kamikita 
areas, importation of young cows was recommended. The main elements as part of the proposed loan 
of US$5.2 million to the Agricultural Land Mechanical Development Public Corporation (Corpora-
tion)47 were to import:
1. Machineries for clearance, plowing and harrowing of about 12,000 hectares of land in Kamakita 
area in Northern Honshu with foreign exchange requirements of US$550,000;
2. Machineries for similar operations of 12,000 hectares of land in Konsen area in Hokkaido with 
foreign exchange requirements of US$ 600,000;
3. Machineries for draining, irrigation and soil dressing for 100,000 hectares of peatland in Shinotsu 
area in Ishikari Valley in Hokkaido with foreign exchange requirements of US$3,100,000; and,
4. Cattle for distribution to settlers, of US$950,000.
The preparation of each component of the loan and the basis for project formulation was complicat-
ed from the beginning, as diﬀerent agencies had to handle the various components of the project. It 
was decided that the Corporation would undertake reclamation in Kamakita and Konsen areas. The 
works in Shinotsu area, the largest of the projects, would be undertaken by a government agency, the 
Hokkaido Development Bureau and the Corporation would make available specialized modern ma-
chineries for construction of various works and for soil dressing. It was determined that the purchase 
of cattle and its distribution would be looked after by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and by 
prefectural governments. This would ensure the Corporation would confine itself to providing the nec-
essary foreign exchange for the purpose. The project was primarily intended to introduce modern me-
chanical methods of land reclamation for the three diﬀerent types of unused land. This made perfect 
sense, as much wider areas of unutilized lands was available in the vicinity of each chosen area for the 
pilot projects. If pilot operations were successful, the process would naturally be extended gradually 
beyond the project sites to develop further farms.48
On the basis of the project concept discussed above, Japan and the WB started discussions on the 
details of a potential loan operation. In order to facilitate discussions on the features of the loan, initial 
discussions were held among oﬃcials of the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Agriculture and Hok-
kaido Development Agency, the Corporation and the WB on March 1956, in Tokyo rather than in 
Washington. The main issues during the meeting then were: (1) how to secure local funds financed by 
the Government and/or the Corporation specifically to finance the initial capital investment as well as 
47 As suggested by the WB, the Government established in October1955, the Corporation, a Government agency, to undertake 
leasing operations of modern equipments for land reclamation as well as improvement.
48 In the Archives, the available documents are mainly related to ones associated with the preparation of legal documents and 
thus they lack records of agricultural expertsʼ discussions with famers in the areas.
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working capital for the Corporation, in order to fund investment for the construction of dams and 
pumping stations associated with the project and to assist settlers utilize the reclaimed lands; (2) the 
necessary understanding on procurement procedures on imports of machineries and cattle; (3) proper 
specifications of machineries and tractors to be imported by the Corporation; and, (4) the guidelines 
to govern the use of imported equipment by the Corporation and by other Government agencies other 
than the Corporation.
The WB tried to secure the commitment of the Government on local cost financing and proper exe-
cution of the projects without the need for any new legislation to be enacted in the Diet. Though in or-
der to simplify the legal structure of the proposed loan, several components were put together to form 
one project, unfortunately because of that intention, the discussions became protracted again.49 This 
time as well there were prickly issues that had to be dealt with. For example using the Shinotsu project 
as an example, the work for this project would be implemented by the Hokkaido Development Bureau, 
but the machinery would be imported by the Corporation. In order to ensure local cost financing and 
proper implementation of this part of the project, the legal relationship among the Corporation, the 
Hokkaido Development Bureau, the Government and the WB had to be established.
In the end, the project concept was kept as originally prepared and the total capital cost of the proj-
ect was estimated at about US$8.7 million. The loan amount was reduced from the original figure of 
US$5.2 million to US$4.3 million since ocean freight charges would not be financed by the proposed 
loan and the government found that some of the machinery needed for the Reclamation and Shinotsu 
projects could be procured within Japan.50 The loan was finally sent to the Board of the WB and ap-
proved on December 14, 1956.
Available documents in the Archives on the projects and the loan are mainly related to the process-
ing of the loan. Thus it is diﬃcult to establish the relationship between the original purpose of the proj-
ects and possible eﬀects it had on the farmers in the reclaimed area and on other reclamation pro-
grams in Japan. However, on the basis of the review of available reports on the project implementation 
in the Archives, it is apparent that: (1) the implementation of the Kamikita and Konsen reclamation 
projects went well with settlers who were working under satisfactory conditions and with the result 
was an expansion of reclaimed areas within Hokkaido and in other parts of Japan such as another area 
in Kyushu; (2) the implementation of the Shinotsu project went on well too with limited use of leased 
machinery from the Corporation, as the soil-dressing program was modified to use mud pumps in-
49 The letter from the WB, signed by Dorr to Mr. Tsutomu Narita, President of Agricultural Land Development Corporation dat-
ed January 21, 1956. Two sets of minutes of the meetings in Tokyo are available one for the meetings in March and the other, 
during July/August 1956. Japan-Agriculture Project—Negotiations 01 Folder #1857674, WB Archives. Also see Memoran-
dum, SLC/O/859, Staﬀ Loan Committee, “Japan—Draft Loan Documents for Proposed Agricultural Projects, Memorandum 
from Department of Operations Asia—Middle East, July 9, 1956 in the same Folder.
50 Memorandum SLC/O/876, Staﬀ Loan Committee, “Japan-Proposed Loan to the Agriculture Land Development Machinery 
Public Corporation for Three Land Reclamation Projects and the Importation of Cattle”, Memorandum from Department if 
Operations Asia-Middle East, November 21, 1956, Folder #1857675, WB Archives. And also Appraisal Report on Mechanical 
Land Reclamation Project, November 29, 1956, the World Bank.
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stead of hauling units; (3) the cattle import program was implemented without any major problems 
and about 7,700 head of cattle, as compared with the original plan of 5,000 head, were distributed to 
farmers and about 50％ went to Hokkaido and Aomori in support of the reclamation and settlement 
works; and, (4) the Corporation operated and maintained imported machinery properly.51 Table 5 be-
low should be above indicates the revision of costs while there were changes in project implementation 
as explained above:
Loan to Aichi Irrigation Public Corporation
The Aichi Irrigation project was one of the projects evaluated by the agricultural sector mission that 
visited Japan in July/August 1954. The missionʼs view on the project was favorable for a possible WB 
lending, to carry out a multi-purpose program in Aichi to improve and extend the irrigation of about 
33,000 hectares of paddy and upland fields east of Nagoya. In addition the project would also provide 
the expanded capacity of water supply and power generation to the region. The project was under 
preparation by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry since 1951 and had political significance with 
a long-standing Government commitment. The cost was estimated at US$70 million or ¥25 billion or 
equivalent with a foreign exchange component of about US$10 million (Ibid., “Present Position and 
Prospects of Agriculture in Japan”, January 1955, pp. 29‒30).
Although these components looked attractive for WB financing as they were in support of Japanʼs 
eﬀorts to increase food production, the WB had to grapple with many organizational, financial and 
management problems. The complexity it had to face can be seen with the fact that in order to imple-
ment the project, it had to deal with three national Ministries, five prefectural governments and an au-
tonomous corporation. Even after a consensus it took a long time to prepare the technical/engineering 
report on the project, and then to make operational arrangements with local governments and Power 
51 Memorandum, J. H. Connors to R. A. Reid, Summary Report of Agriculture Machinery Corporation Japan, September 3, 
1957, Japan-Agriculture Folder #1857676; Memorandum, J. H. Connors to R. A. Reid, Back-to-Oﬃce Report, Agriculture 
Land Development Machinery Corporation-Loan 158-JA, November 3, 1958; and, Memorandum, W. A. Wapenhans to R. A. 
Reid, Back-to-Oﬃce Report-End-Use Inspection Japan 158-JA, Land Reclamation Project, October 17, 1962, Japan-Agricul-
ture Folder # 1857677, WB Archives.
Table?5.?Loan to the Agriculture Corporation
(US$ 000)
Appraisal Actual
Kamikita 490 1,418
Konsen 510 467
Shinotsu 2,416 884
Cattle 884 1,348
Total 4,300 4,118
Sources: Appraisal figures are from Appraisal Report on Mechanical Land Reclamation Project, No-
vember 29, 1956, pp. 2‒3 and actual figures, from Memorandum, A. Casson to N. Chakra-
varti, Loan 158-JA List of Goods, June 9, 1961, Japan-Agriculture Folder # 1857677, WB 
Archives.
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Company. The Government established the Aichi Irrigation Public Corporation (AIPC) in October 
1955 at the suggestion of the WB, established on the lines of Agriculture Land Development Machin-
ery Public Corporation. The AIPC and the WB continued discussion on project preparation both in 
Tokyo and Washington. The main points of discussions were the progress of the design work by the 
consultants, cost estimates of the main work, irrigation plan for water use by farmers, land acquisition 
and Government financing of the project.52 By the end of 1956 the WB doubted the readiness of the 
project for appraisal. The reasons were that the cost estimates were still uncertain, apart from that the 
irrigation systems as well their management, and the water charges to farmers were still to be deter-
mined.53
The WB finally received the results of the engineering studies at the end of 1956 to find part of infor-
mation still incomplete, particularly on the specifics on the management of the irrigation system. A 
key letter from the WB to the AIPC dated March 11, 1957 stated that,
[. . .] on the whole the engineering and agricultural questions are being satisfactorily clari-
fied, there remain a few matters on which we would like to further information.
[. . .] In order to confirm and update our understanding, we are sending you the attached 
list of the questions upon which were at present insuﬃciently informed. [. . .]54
The main questions were related to the AIPCʼs future financial situation, estimates of the average farm-
erʼs net income both before and after irrigation, information on all subsidies provided to the farmers, 
the division of responsibility among the AIPC, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and the Pre-
fecture for planning and operations beyond the secondary canals. Eventually, the Corporation did fur-
nish answers to most of the questions raised in the March WB letter. After reevaluating the nature of 
WBʼs association with the project and the AIPC, the WB finally invited the AIPC to send negotiators 
to Washington on June 15, 1957.55
According to the appraisal report56 on the project, the purpose of the project was to increase food 
production, by about 100,00 tons (brown rice equivalent which was about 3％ of the national food 
deficit) and to test the feasibility of irrigation on rolling upland country, a type of farming new to Ja-
pan. The basic components of the proposed project were: (1) construction of a rock-fill dam for irriga-
52 Various Memoranda written in Tokyo by D. W. Jeﬀries on the discussions between the Corporation and the WB on the Project 
from August 2-September 26, 1956, Japan-Aichi Water Project Folder #1857718, WB Archives.
53 Memorandum, Piccagli/Reid/Kephart, “JAPAN—STATUS OF AICHI PROJECT”, December 6, 1956, Japan-Aichi Water Proj-
ect Folder #1857718, WB Archives.
54 Letter, Bernard Chadenet to Mr. Shiro Sakurai, Director of Technical Aﬀairs, the Corporation, Macrch11, 1957, Japan-Aichi 
Water Project Folder #1857719, WB Archives.
55 Memorandum SLC/O/892, Staﬀ Loan Committee, Department of Operations Far East, Japan-Aichi Irrifation and WaterShp-
ply Project, April 23, 1957, Japan-Aichi Water Project Folder #1857719, WB Archives and Memorandum, Richard F. Quandt 
to Mr. Martin M. Rosen, “Japan: Aichi Irrigation Project—Degree of the Bankʼs Commitment to make the Loan,” April 26, 
1957, Japan-Aichi Water Project Folder #1857719, WB Archives.
56 Appraisal Report on Aichi Irrigation Project, July 30, 1957, the World Bank.
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tion purposes with an eﬀective capacity of 69 million m3 at Makio Bridge on the Otaki River, US$11.8 
million equivalent; a main canal, 114 km long, US$26.8 million; secondary canals, totaling 1,300 km, 
US$11.2 million; regulating reservoirs, US$3.8 million; land reclamation, US$4.3 million; (2) the in-
stallation of a power plant with 10,000 kW capacity, US$1.8 million, and a water supply system, 
US$8.1 million; (3) right of way, US$7.1 million; overhead and expenses, US$6.3 million; engineering, 
field expenses and supervision by consultants, US$7 million. Adding contingencies and interest during 
construction, the total cost was estimated at about US$100 million with a foreign exchange component 
of about US$7 million for which WB lending was requested.
The proposed loan was to finance foreign exchange needed for the imports of heavy machinery for 
the construction of the dam, canals and reservoirs in the Aichi area. The payments for services went 
towards foreign irrigation and construction consultants and training AIPC personnel in the tech-
niques of ridge land irrigation (Ibid., Appraisal Report Annex B). The AIPC was to construct and op-
erate the project. The Association of Farmers would construct and operate the supplementary works in 
the area to supply irrigation water. The Aichi Prefecture would build, with funds provided by the 
AIPC, operate potable and industrial water facilities. An arrangement was made for the reimburse-
ment of the proportionate share of the AIPCʼs investments. A contract between the AIPC and the Kan-
sai Power Company was made on similar lines with respect to the installation of an electric power sta-
tion. Besides WB loan the project cost of about US$100 million, the AIPC was to be financed through 
subsidies from the Central Government of US$24 million equivalent; loans from the Central Govern-
ment of US$53 million; and, provision of P. L. 480 counterpart funds of US$17 million (Ibid., Apprais-
al Report, p. 7).
The benefits from the project according to the Appraisal Report (Ibid., p. 8), was an estimated mar-
ket value of US$13 million a year in increased agricultural production. This meant that production in 
the area would see an increase of more than 60％. Nearly 90％ of the increase would come from addi-
tional rice, vegetables and fruit production. Irrigation was to be improved for farms that already exist-
ed, and new farms were to be expanded on unused land in the area. This meant that many paddy fields 
in Aichi that were used in winter to store water, would soon be irrigated and would be available for 
growing winter vegetables and cereals.
On the ridge lands, increased production would come from a wider cropping pattern and from 
higher yields of crops that were damaged by severe drought in late summer. According to the WB an-
nouncement concerning the project, the paddy farmers should have no diﬃculty in maximizing on 
benefits from the project almost immediately bearing in mind that rice farming was already an old and 
highly developed skill in Japan. The real diﬃculty was seen as the rapidity with which famers could 
master the intricacies of irrigation on rolling ridge lands, which was a new kind of agricultural tech-
nique in Japan. However, Japanese farmers were renown for their competence and diligence and were 
expected to obtain maximum yields, once enough experience was gained in applying water manage-
ment under these conditions. They were to receive further training and guidance in acquiring the nec-
?     ?243
Japan and the World Bank, 1951?1966: Japan as a Borrower (2)
essary skills from the results of research being carried out by the Government.
During negotiations, it was clear that the WB had tried its best in ensuring the smooth implementa-
tion of the project by insisting the involvement of foreign consultants. These consultants were respon-
sible for designing and supervising the construction of the dam, reservoirs and main canals, irrigation 
consultants were used for general planning and secondary canal design, soil conservation and earth 
moving, and irrigation operation. Negotiations in Washington took about two weeks to complete.57 In 
the end, the loan amount was reduced from the originally proposed US$10 million to US$7 million 
and the list goods to be financed through the loan (Ibid., Appraisal Report, Annex B) were:
1.　Consulting services for design and construction US$1.50 million
2.　Construction equipment US$4.40 million
3.　Consulting services for upland irrigation US$0.04 million
4.　Interest during construction US$1.06 million
Total US$7.00 million
The WBʼs Board approved the loan on August 8, 1957. This loan was the last one for the agriculture 
sector and also the last one under the initial WBʼs lending framework (totaling US$ 100 million for 
several years covering only financing of foreign exchange costs). The implementation of the project 
was not completely documented in the files of the project at the WB Archives. The review of available 
information indicates the poor relationship between the Corporation and the WB. Although their reg-
ular visits to the project sites to assess the progress of implementation of the agriculture component 
were made, the WBʼs engineer did not make visits to the construction sites after December 1958.58 The 
Corporation did not send progress reports to the WB as prescribed in the Loan Agreement. As such, 
the progress of works was not monitored properly and the final costs of construction works were un-
known. It was certain that there were cost increases, as additional works were required to repair the 
damages caused by a typhoon that struck the area in September 1959 and an extremely heavy rain-
storm in June 1961. There were also some increases in unit cost of construction.
The relationship between the Corporation and the consultant firm for design and construction, were 
not good either. For example, there were contractual issues relating to the extension of the original 
contract. Though the consultants considered the dam and waterways system still incomplete, about 
45％ of the waterways were already put to use. According to the letter from the AIPC to the WB, the fi-
nal loan disbursements amounted to only about $4.9 million as of April 1962 against the originally in-
57 A complete set of minutes of the meeting between Japanese delegation and the WB is available in Japan-Aichi Water Project 
Folder #1857719, WB Archives.
58 Memorandum, Jack H. Connors to P. A. Reid, Report on the Aichi Irrigation Project-Loan 173-JA, December 31, 1958, Ja-
pan-Aichi Water Project Folder #1857720, WB Archives.
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tended loan amount of US$ 7 million.59 On the basis of limited available information, the project was 
implemented without additional major problems or big expenses, and agricultural activities increased 
as expected. Beyond that, the WBʼs contribution towards the project implementation cannot be as-
sessed properly.
4.?Dramatic Changes in the WB?s Lending Policy to Japan
Observing positive developments with the Japanese economy in 1955 and the first few months of 
1956, the WB staﬀ started to consider the possibility of increasing the lending ceiling of US$100 mil-
lion. The desk oﬃcer discussed this possibility with the Embassy staﬀ of Japan in March 1956. The re-
action from the Embassy staﬀ then was that an increased foreign exchange lending would create in 
turn, an additional need of local currency. Since Government expenditures were increasing rapidly 
anyway, it was perceived diﬃcult to find new projects for potential WB foreign exchange financing that 
would require additional local currency.60
There were also outstanding issues on the execution of lending operations to Japan as already men-
tioned in the previous section. Realizing the apparent need to change its lending policy to Japan, the 
WB management took judicious steps in this direction. The first formal step was taken when the WB 
President met with the Minister of Finance from Japan during the Annual Meetings in September 
1956. They discussed the status of loan negotiations on the Agricultural Development and Kawasaki 
projects, and the WB President himself proposed to send an economic mission in 1957 to consider 
whether there were any other ways in which the WB might assist Japan. The Minister welcomed this 
proposition and hoped that Mr. Black himself would visit Japan in the near future.61
In December 1956, the management of the WB instructed the department in charge to prepare a 
new approach to future lending to Japan. The department prepared a memorandum entitled “Future 
Bank Lending to Japan” dated February 5, 1957.62 Its conclusions were: (1) Though a full analysis of Ja-
panʼs credit worthiness is required, the progress made by the Japanese economy during recent years in-
dicates that she could now safely undertake further external borrowings; and, (2) Assuming any addi-
tional lending towards funding projects, it would be in the form of financing a percentage of capital 
cost of the projects, without much regard to the foreign exchange component.
In order to reach these conclusions, the memorandum explained succinctly how Japan achieved 
high rates of economic growth without jeopardizing economic stability. The document also acknowl-
59 Letter, President of Aichi Irrigation Public Corporation to the World Bank, “List of Goods Aichi Project‒Loan No. 173 JA”, 
April 11, 1962, Japan-Aichi Water Project Folder # 1857722. Several memoranda exist in the Archives discussing agricultural 
activities and civil works on the Project in Japan-Aichi Water Project Folders #1857720‒1857722.
60 Memorandum, D. W. Jeﬀries to Files, Japan—March 22 Meeting With Minister Suzuki, March 22, 1956, Japan-General, Folder 
#1857455, WB Archives.
61 Memorandum, R. Goodman to J. R. Rucinski, Notes of Meeting between Representatives of the Japanese Government and the 
Bank on Friday, September 28, 1956, dated October 8, 1956, Japan-General, Folder #1857456, WB Archives.
62 Memorandum SLC/0/883, Department of Operations, Asia and Middle East to Staﬀ Loan Committee, Future Bank Lending 
to Japan, February 5, 1957, Japan-General, Folder #1857456, WB Archives.
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edged the radical improvement in her international balance of payments, emphasizing dramatic in-
crease in exports and well-controlled increase in imports. The impressive increase in export was 
achieved through the increased sales of capital goods and heavy industrial products and maintaining a 
higher than expected rate in textile exports. Exports of non-ferrous metal products had also increased 
markedly. Assuming that total world trade continued to expand, Japan would be able to share fully in 
these larger markets. Increased trade for Japan implied lower than expected dependency on US mili-
tary special procurements and the increased ability to make debt repayments including public debt, all 
pre-war debt, reparation and war claims settlements. The memorandum further stated that:
[. . .] A more thorough study is required to determine the amount of additional external debt, 
which Japan could prudently incur. It seems clear that the amount is likely to be substantial 
and justifies consideration now of the general principles that should apply to future lending 
to Japan [. . .]. (Ibid., p. 4)
However, as the expansion of the economy continued, bottlenecks in power, transportation and iron 
and steel appeared, despite the fact that these industries received their full share of attention in post-
war investment programs. Investment in these sectors would be required if Japan was to be self- 
supporting and provide a better standard of living for its people. It was widely felt in conservative cir-
cles that unless moves were made toward such an expansion, a government committed to socialistic 
methods would inevitably come to power. Investment expenditures to meet those ends over the next 
five years were now imperative, on an even larger scale. The evaluation of such high-priority invest-
ment requirements indicated that they were likely to exceed domestic savings, even if some annual in-
crease in national income were taken into account. A substantial amount of additional foreign borrow-
ing seemed essential for Japan, especially in the near future (Ibid., pp. 5‒6).
On the second conclusion, the memorandum conceded that many of past loans were inconveniently 
small and had a relatively minor foreign exchange component. Only the loans to the three power com-
panies and Kawasaki steel had a larger foreign exchange component, and they were considered excep-
tional. By then as Japan developed its capital goods industries, which supplied the bulk of her domestic 
requirements and made an important contribution to exports. Imports of capital goods were marginal 
or they were mostly special items of machinery and equipment. The WB was aware that as Japanese in-
dustry modernized its techniques, it would be increasingly diﬃcult to implement any lending program 
of significant amounts tied to imports of machinery and equipment, particularly if they were also tied 
to projects. Furthermore, if foreign exchange financing would continue as before, the WBʼs financial 
contribution to particular projects or enterprises would be too small to influence their project design, 
organization or execution.
Accordingly, the memorandum recommended that the WB shift from foreign exchange financing to 
local expenditure financing. It was also in support of the project lending approach and rejected the 
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idea of lending to a development bank in Japan to make local expenditure loans. The memorandum 
also explained that to undertaking local expenditure financing does not eliminate the problems inher-
ent in the Japanese legal and constitutional system. It recommended a rather flexible approach for the 
WB, recognizing that the Japanese might be expected to make eﬀective use of resources, though their 
methods diﬀer widely from those of the West. This approach would then reduce lending diﬃculties to 
a level mutually acceptable to the WB as well as Japan and eventually enable the undertaking of larger 
individual loans based on the local expenditure principle. The memorandum further indicated that the 
sectors and projects for prospective WB financing included: the iron and steel industry, railroad trans-
portation, electric power sector, important land reclamation projects such as the Hachiro Lagoon, the 
coal industry, regional development plans in Hokkaido and highway construction programs (Ibid., pp. 
6‒7).
The WBʼs management reviewed the above conclusions and recommendations and expressed their 
general agreement with the findings on Japanʼs recent economic progress and the future direction of fi-
nancing local cost of Japanese projects. However, the management expressed its caution in making 
firm conclusions on the creditworthiness of the country, as they wanted to also confirm it through the 
analysis of the forthcoming mission to Japan. The management also urged for a study on the JDB, in 
order to determine whether the JDB would be a useful and desirable vehicle for future WB operations. 
Other proposals included the setting up of a separate or joint market operations with private financial 
institutions to draw in additional foreign exchange resources, considering the substantial need for for-
eign resources to finance Japanʼs development eﬀorts.63
The next step that was taken internally was the reorganization of the Department within the WB 
that was responsible for operations in Japan. The Annual Report 1957/58 of the WB (page 26) stated 
that:
In April 1957, a new Department was formed in the Bank to assist in handling the growing 
volume of work in Asia. Over the last two years, the total lent in that Region has more than 
doubled and a corresponding increase has take place in the Bankʼs advisory work. Responsi-
bility has therefore been assigned to a separate Department of Operations, Far East, for the 
following countries: Burma, Ceylon, China, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Thai-
land and Viet Nam. Relations with the remaining countries that were formally the responsi-
bility of the Department of Operations, Asia and the Middle East are now handled by the De-
partment of Operations, Middle East.64
In April 1957, in accordance with the decision of the WBʼs management, the economic mission vis-
63 Vide Memorandum SLC/M/660, Minutes of Staﬀ Loan Committee Meeting held on Monday, February 11, 1957, Japan-Gen-
eral, Folder #1857456, WB Archives.
64 Thirteenth Annual Report: 1957‒1958, the World Bank
?     ?247
Japan and the World Bank, 1951?1966: Japan as a Borrower (2)
ited Japan to stay in the country till end of May. Its report was published on July 25, 1957 as discussed 
in the second section of this paper. While the economic mission was reviewing the Japanese economy, 
it also had the task of scheduling the visit of President Black to Japan and convincing the Government 
on the positive role of the WB through the changes put forward to its lending policy in local cost fi-
nancing. Given the Government eﬀorts at that time to reduce the current account deficits in the bal-
ance of payments problems, the Government was skeptical about the increased borrowing from the 
WB, as any borrowing was considered “inflationary”. Within the Ministry of Finance, one important 
question was how eﬀective the WB would be as an agency to assist the Ministry in performing its 
function as the arbiter of allocating budgetary resources, considering each Ministry claimed for a larg-
er share of these resources.65
When the economic mission was still in Japan, the President of the WB, Mr. Black, visited the coun-
try for 11 days. The Director of the new Department, Mr. Rosen, accompanied him. According to the 
minutes of the meeting between the Minister of Finance, Mr. Ikeda, and Mr. Black, they discussed Ja-
panʼs proposed borrowing from the WB, the prospects of private US investment in Kobe‒Nagoya 
highway project, and others.66 On the proposed borrowing, the Minister presented a list of projects in 
the power, steel and highway sectors with a total investment amounting to US$770 million, over the 
course of the next five to six years. The WB was to finance about 30％ to 40％ of the total cost, virtually 
all in local currency. The Government intention was to borrow foreign exchange resources substantial-
ly from the US Export‒Import Bank to finance imported equipment with the Governmentʼs guarantee. 
For the WB, it was impossible to accept the proposal to divide the financing, where the US Export‒Im-
port Bank would finance imported equipment and while local currency expenditures were to be fi-
nanced by the WB.
Mr. Black explained that the WB could make loans for local currency expenditures only on the ex-
ceptional condition, i.e. where the bulk of the required capital equipment was produced in the borrow-
ing country and only relatively small amounts of equipment had to be imported. In other words, the 
WBʼs lending should include necessary import items even if others were to finance these imports. Mr. 
Black made it rather explicit as to how far Japan could go with borrowing from the US Export‒Import 
Bank, i.e. the question of exceptions for which import equipment financing was to be from the US Ex-
port‒Import Bank in addition to the US$50 million contract being negotiated at an advanced stage. In 
the end, an agreement was reached that Japan would prepare a 4‒5 year general investment and bor-
rowing program including specific proposals for the next two years for further discussion. Though the 
specific amount of lending was not discussed, it was reasonable for Japan to expect that 30％‒40％ of 
the total project costs would be covered by the WBʼs local currency loans. Mr. Black also mentioned 
65 Letters from Tokyo, J. de Wilde to Martin Rosen, Letter 4, undated and Letter 10, April 22, 1957, Japan-General, Folder 
#1857456, WB Archives.
66 Memorandum, H. E. Tolley to Files, “Japan—Meeting between Mr. Black and the Minister of Finance, May 15, 1957”, May 27, 
1957, Japan-General, Folder #1857456, WB Archives.
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that the WB was prepared to speed up loan negotiations and to be more flexible in setting up of loan 
conditions.
It is interesting to note that the WB and the government discussed the possibility of joint financing 
the highway project with US private investment, as an important step in re-establishing the strong po-
sition that Japanese bonds held in foreign capital markets before the war. Other subjects of concern 
was the decision made by the Government to release the remaining US$35 million of Japanʼs 18％ sub-
scription to the WB over the next five years, the WBʼs request for Japan to purchase part of a two year 
bond issue in 1958, and Japanʼs request for the expansion of WBʼs lending operations to Southeast Asia 
implying more business to Japanese industries.
In Japan, in addition to the meeting with the Minister of Finance, Mr. Black met with key Ministers 
and business leaders and visited factories in Osaka and Chiba. His impression of Japan was positive 
and he made a presentation on his visit to Japan in the Board meeting on May 27, 1957, a few days 
after his return to Washington. The last paragraph of his speech was:
[. . .] I was very impressed with the progress in the country, with the skill and the energy 
and the resourcefulness. When I say “energy,” that means the hard work, and the resourceful-
ness and the managerial ability of the Japanese people. Of course they have problems, as ev-
erybody else has, but you canʼt help but be impressed with the job that they have done and 
are doing today. I was also greatly impressed with the literacy. It is about 99 percent there. It 
was a very profitable trip.67
His visit to Japan signaled the start of the new WB approach to future lending to Japan. The mis-
match between Japanʼs needs and the WBʼs lending would dissipate and a new era of Japanʼs borrow-
ing from the WB was going to start from then on.
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ANNEX 1
Basic Structure of the WB Projects and Loans †
Yawata Steel Project
 1. Borrower: Japan Development Bank (JDB)
 2. Guarantor: Government of Japan
 3. Loan Amount: US$5.3 million1 relent to Yawata Iron Steel
 4. Date of Loan: 10/25/1955
 5. Eﬀective Date: 02/16/1956
 6. Closing Date: 12/31/1957
 7. Terms of Loan: 15 years
 8. Interest Rate: 4‒5/8％
 9. Project Description: The total cost of Yawata steel project amounting to about US$15.6 million 
equivalent was to assist Yawata Steel Company to replace three obsolete plate mills by a single 
modern four high plate mill in the city of Yawata. The loan of US$5.3 million would finance all 
the foreign exchange costs of the imported equipment required for the project.
10. Security: Broadly similar to those in the previous power loans. A general Mortgage Note by Yawa-
ta in favor of JDB, which the latter in turn pledge to the WB. According to the records of negotia-
tions of this loan, outstanding obligations to create liens in favor of Japanʼs commercial banks and 
negative pledge clauses in favor of such banks existed and those existing arrangements, believed 
† Sources: Five Report and Recommendations of the President to the Executive Directors on each Loan published by the World 
Bank.
1 Of which US$171,142 was cancelled according to Annual Report 1960‒1961, the World Bank.
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to be about 50 agreements, had to be altered or cancelled.
11. Legal Instruments and Legal Authority: Similar to the previous power loans, the legal instru-
ments were the Loan Agreement between the WB and the JDB, the Project Agreement between 
the WB and Yawata, and the Guarantee Agreement between Japan and the WB. As part of the 
Loan Agreements, a financial covenants letter to Yawata was signed to improve its debt-equity ra-
tio in accordance with an agreed schedule and the margin between its total external liabilities and 
its current assets. As part of the Guarantee Agreement, the Guarantor would undertake to make 
the provisions of its negative pledge clause eﬀective concerning liens on assets of political subdivi-
sion and their agencies. An undertaking to make the negative pledge concerning liens on the as-
sets of the Bank of Japan was, however, given separately.
12. Justification: The proposed project would remove deficiencies in existing equipment, improve the 
amount and quality of the product, and reduce costs and increase Yawataʼs ability to compete in 
export markets. Annual capacity would increase from 342,000 tons to about 360,000 tons, and 
unit production costs would be lowered by about 12％.
Various Industrial Projects
 1. Borrower: Japan Development Bank
 2. Guarantor: Government of Japan
 3. Loan Amount:  US$8.1 million2 relent to four companies:
  Nippon Steel Tube  US$2.6 million
  Mitsubishi Shipbuilding and Engineering US$1.5 million
  Ishikawajima Heavy Industry US$1.65million
  Toyota Motor US$2.35million
 4. Date of Loan: 02/21/1956
 5. Eﬀective Date: 05/10/1956
 6. Closing Date: 12/31/1958
 7. Life of Loan:  15 years
 8. Interest Rate: 4‒3/4％
 9. Project Description: The loan would finance the purchase of more than 100 imported machines 
and machine tools for various modernization projects being undertaken by the four companies. 
The Nippon Steel Tube would construct a new seamless tube mill to replace two obsolete mills; 
Mitsubishi would install new equipment to facilitate production of turbo superchargers and 
heavy components for modern diesel engines; Ishikawajima would retool for the manufacture of 
larger and more powerful marine steam turbines, marine turbo supercharges and heavy industrial 
machinery; and, Toyota would import machinery and equipment for manufacturing components 
2 Of which US$539,555 was cancelled according to Annual Report 1960‒1961, the World Bank.
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for trucks and buses.
10.  Security Arrangements: No provision was made for the WB to receive from the JDB, the security, 
which the JDB receives from the beneficiary enterprises. The WB would obtain from the JDB a 
negative pledge clause in the usual form.
11.  Legal Instruments and Legal Authority: The legal instruments were the Loan Agreement between 
the WB and the JDB, and the Guarantee Agreement between Japan and the WB. But no Project 
Agreement between the WB and the beneficiary enterprises, as the WB would not have any con-
tractual relations with the enterprises. The Loan Agreement included the JDB causing the proj-
ects to be properly carried out. The Guarantee Agreement included Japanʼs guarantee payment 
but not performance and also the negative pledge clause in the same form as Yawataʼs case.
12. Justification: Modernization of Japanese heavy industry, including shipbuilding, was of basic im-
portance to the economy. These industries not only produced for the domestic market, but were 
also a principal source of export earnings. The projects would result in more eﬃcient operation, 
lower production costs, and improvement in the quality of their products.
Kawasaki Steel Project
 1. Borrower:  Japan Development Bank
 2. Guarantor: Government of Japan
 3. Loan Amount: US$20 million relent to Kawasaki Steel
 4. Date of Loan: 12/19/1956
 5. Eﬀective Date: 03/25/1957
 6. Closing Date: 04/30/1959
 7. Terms of Loan: 15 years
 8. Interest Rate: 5％
 9. Project Description: The loan would cover the foreign exchange cost of imported equipment for a 
semi-continuous hot and cold strip mill and of related facilities with 300,000 tons capacity at 
Kawasakiʼs Chiba plant near Tokyo. The new strip mill was the final stage of the construction of a 
fully integrated steel plant at Chiba. The total cost of the project was estimated at US$45 million.
10. Security: No provision was made for the WB to receive from the JDB, the security which the JDB 
receives from the Kawasaki. The WB would obtain from the JDB a negative pledge clause in the 
usual form. In comparison with other loans, this loan had unusual characteristics with respect to 
actions to be taken before the loan becomes eﬀective to improve financial condition of the Kawa-
saki. The financial actions would be through: “Creditors Agreement” between Kawasaki and its 
long-term creditors to postpone and extend maturities of the long-term debt; “Paramount Agree-
ment” between Kawasaki and the long-term creditors for them to defer repayment of the princi-
pal amounts to protect Kawakiʼs working capital; and, “Daiichi Agreement” between Kawasaki 
and the Daiichi Bank for Daiichi to provide a line of credit and to refund Kawasakiʼs mortgage 
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bonds. In addition, one of eﬀectiveness condition was that Kawasaki should have entered into the 
agreement with its creditors to borrow ¥4 billion of new long-term debt.
11. Legal Instruments and Legal Authority: The legal instruments were the Loan Agreement between 
the WB and the Japan Development Bank (JDB), the Project Agreement between the WB and the 
Kawasaki, and the Guarantee Agreement between Japan and the WB. The Loan/Project Agree-
ment reflected an approach of the WB to use the power of the JDB for financial transaction and 
project implementation through the Subsidiary Loan Agreement between the JDB and the Kawa-
saki. The Guarantee Agreement was similar to previous guarantee agreements with Japan.
12. Justification: The Kawasaki Steel was one of the largest steel producers in Japan. It constructed 
modern blast and open-hearth furnaces and a high capacity blooming mill in Chiba, but its fin-
ishing facilities were located some 300 miles away in the Kobe area. It was a major producer of 
steel sheet but forced to rely upon ineﬃcient pullover hand mills for this product. The new mill 
would enable Kawasaki Steel to benefit more fully from its large investment at Chiba, would re-
duce the cost of its sheet production, and would improve the quality of the product.
Mechanical Land Reclamation Project
 1. Borrower:  Agricultural Land Development Machinery Public Corporation
 2. Guarantor:  Government of Japan
 3. Loan Amount: US$4.3 million3
 4. Date of Loan: 12/14/1956
 5. Eﬀective Date: 03/19/1956 (Kamikita and Konsen component);
  03/19/1957 (dairy cattle component); and,
  05/15/1957 (Shinotsu project component)
 6. Closing Date:  03/31/1959
 7. Terms of Loan: 15 years
 8. Interest Rate: 5％
 9. Project Description: Japan imported about 20％ of her food requirements, with population in-
creasing; she had to increase her agricultural production by 15％ within 10 years. This project was 
a part of the program to enhance the food production. The proposed loan would finance the im-
port of equipment, amounting to US$1 million, for pilot projects on the Kamikita and Konsen ar-
eas of Northern Honshu and Hokkaido to test the feasibility of large scale and rapid reclamation 
of land by the use of modern land clearing and earthmoving equipment; a part of the loan, 
US$2.4 million, would finance the cost of modern earthmoving and construction equipment for 
reclamation in the Shinotsu are of the valley in Hokkaido; and, in order to foster the development 
of mixed farming, the loan would finance the import of 5,000 head of dairy cattle breeding stock 
3 Of which US$183,076 was cancelled according to Annual Report 1960–1961, the World Bank.
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over the period of three years.
10. Legal Instruments and Legal Authority: The legal instruments were the Loan Agreement between 
the WB and the Agricultural Land Development Machinery Public Corporation, and the Guaran-
tee Agreement between Japan and the WB. The complication came from the fact that the loan it-
self was a package of 4 diﬀerent sub-loans, of which the Borrower was directly responsible for 
only two. The Loan Agreement provided specific responsibilities of the Corporation, i.e. under-
taking the Kamikita and Konsen projects plus additional agreed projects to be carried out with 
the imported machinery, procuring equipment and lease it to Hokkaido Development Bureau 
and importing cattle for the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and sale of cattle to farmers to-
gether with prefectural governments. The Guarantee Agreement contained covenants concerning 
general commitment of the government and the Corporation to implement the programs the use 
of the imported machinery and agreement to promote the settlement of lands to be reclaimed.
11. Justification: If the pilot projects were successful, they would demonstrate that mechanized meth-
ods could be used eﬀectively on other unused but potentially arable land. Raising livestock of-
fered another venue for increased food production.
Aichi Irrigation Project
 1. Borrower: Aichi Irrigation Public Corporation
 2. Guarantor: Government of Japan
 3. Loan Amount:  US$7 million4
 4. Date of Loan: 08/08/1957
 5. Eﬀective Date: 10/08/1957
 6. Closing Date: 05/31/1961
 7. Terms of Loan: 20 years
 8. Interest Rate: 5‒3/4％
 9. Project Description: The total cost of the project was estimated at about US$100 million equiva-
lent. The projects would make possible the production of about 200,000 tons of additional food 
crops annually through provision of irrigation to 17,000 hectares of paddy fields and 16,000 hect-
ares of upland country; the supply of domestic and industrial water, about 45 million cubic me-
ters, to municipalities including the city of Nagoya; and, the supply of additional 100 million kwh 
per annum to regional power system. The loan would finance the import of heavy earthmoving 
equipment, the consultant services for irrigation and construction, and the training of key per-
sonnel in the organization. The Aichi Irrigation Public Corporation was established to plan, con-
struct and operate a regional irrigation system and accessory works.
10. Legal Instruments and Legal Authority: The legal instruments were the Loan Agreement between 
4 Of which US$2,127,571 was cancelled according to Annual Report 1962–1963, the World Bank.
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the WB and the Aichi Irrigation Public Corporation, and the Guarantee Agreement between Ja-
pan and the WB. The Loan Agreement provided that the Corporation was to employ suitable 
consultants and that the proceeds of the loan might finance the cost of the consulting services and 
also the cost of necessary technical training outside Japan of selected staﬀ of the Corporation. The 
Guarantee Agreement contained a guarantee by the Central Government to ensure that the Cor-
poration would receive funds suﬃcient to cover any shortfall in the resources to carry out the 
project and operate its enterprise.
11. Justification: It was urgently necessary to Japan to increase food production and this project 
would add to food, water and electric supply, but in a broader way it would contribute important-
ly to Japanese knowledge of upland irrigation techniques. The project operations would test the 
feasibility of similar development of much larger areas in Japan with a view to significantly reduc-
ing the national food deficit.
ANNEX 2
Report of the End-Use Mission to Japan, August 5, 1954
The end-use (later this naming was changed to the supervision) mission report of August 5, 1954 on 
the first loans to the three power companies is available in the Archives and this Report prepared by 
the technical experts (in the Technical Operations Department) is one of rare documents, as most of 
documents in the Archives are originated from the country desk (in the Operations Department). The 
report had an overview of the three power companies, Chubu, Kyushu and Kansai Power companies, 
the three beneficiaries of the first WB loans via the Japan Development Bank (JDB) as the borrower. 
The main conclusions were: Thermal capacity presently available is used for peaking and integration 
purposes, the resulting low utilization due mainly to the very small storage capacity of the hydro sys-
tems and to the high cost of steam power generation as compared with current power rates. Eﬃciency 
of thermal generation is very low due both to the low design eﬃciency of many units and to the inter-
mittent type of operation. Specific comments were:
 1. Transmission and distribution facilities are overloaded. Planning for expansion of these facilities 
is unsatisfactory;
 2. Losses of power are very high and are not expected to improve appreciably in the near future;
 3. The committed and Improvement Programs, as defined in the Loan Agreements, are being car-
ried out with some delays and considerable increases of cost especially as regards hydroelectric 
projects. In several instances this appears to be partly caused by inadequate planning;
 4. In finalizing their plans beyond the Committed Programs, the companies are keeping addition of 
new capacity to a minimum and concentrating their eﬀorts on expansion of transmission and dis-
tribution facilities, within the limitations of expected availability of funds. This reverses the policy 
of recent years and should be beneficial in bringing about a better system balance;
 5. The two principal interrelated problems aﬀecting the companiesʼ financial conditions are a con-
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tinued shortage of funds to ensure financing of present expansion and improvement programs 
and the inadequate earning power under present rates to meet increased operational expenses 
and financial charges and to provide a reasonable return on capital;
 6. In January 1954, the three power companies applied to the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry for rate increase amounting to 26.8％ for Chubu, 10.7％ for Kansai and 16.1％ for Ky-
ushu, within a requested national average increases in power rates of 17.1％. Subsequently, the 
companies reduced their requests to 20.8％ for Chubu, 6.3％ for Kansai and 11.1％ for Kyushu, 
respectively, taking account of lower fuel cost resulting from the current decline in coal prices 
and of reductions in taxes and interest rates. The Ministry has favorably commented on these rate 
applications but the Government action to thereon is still outstanding.
On the basis of the above, the Report concludes that: “Inasmuch as the final success of the three 
power projects financed under the WB loans depends to a large extent on the timely completion and 
smooth operation of the companiesʼ overall power programs as well as on their sound financial condi-
tion, the question of rate increases is one of direct concern to the WB.—The most critical current 
needs if the power companies can be listed as follows in order of priority:
1. Obtaining government action on an increase in power rates;
2.  Improving the quality of the companiesʼ present operations, especially at the planning and 
managerial level. Specialized outside assistance may be needed to achieve this purpose.
Source: Report of the End-Use Mission to Japan, dated August 5, 1954 pp. 1‒38, Japan, Folder # 1857454, WB Archives.
